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1. The Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the problem of technical progress 
ECLA's dedication to technical progress, or to science and 
technology, has its somewhat paradoxical aspects. On the one 
hand, from its documents and research work it seems clear that 
the subject has not been one of its main preoccupations. However, 
on the other hand, there is no doubt that this field is one of the 
pillars of what is generically called "ECLA thinking'1. 
In fact, since its inception, the institution has identified 
this aspect as one of the nubs of its concept of the centre-
periphery system. In this respect, many opinions can'be quoted 
which, to some extent, have become classic in the economic literature 
of the region. The following is surely one of the best known and 
most important: 
"The spread of technical progress from countries where it 
had its source to the rest of the world has, from the point 
of view of each generation, been relatively slow and 
irregular. During the long period which elapsed between the 
industrial revolution and the First World War, the new 
methods of production in which technique has constantly 
found its expression have reached only a small proportion 
of the world's population. 
"The' movement began in the United Kingdom, continued in 
varying degrees of intensity in Europe, received an 
extraordinary impulse in the United States and finally 
reached Japan, which strove to rapidly assimilate Western 
methods of production. Thus the great industrial centres 
of the world grew up, while the vast and heterogeneous 
peripheral areas of the new system shared only to a slight 
extent in the improvement of productivity." (ECLA, Economic 
Survey of Latin America, .19^9, page 3). 
At first sight, the comment on the irregular development and 
pattern of that important aspect does not reveal all its implications. 
However, the thesis not only contradicted a previously strongly 
held assumption, but also broached the examination of the consequences 
and future implications of this inequality on a series of primary 
aspects of the problem of development and under-development. 
/It is 
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It is common knowledge that two main currents which appeared 
and prevailed in the nineteenth century and which still reflect 
rival views today - what we could call the liberal and the marxist 
currents - shared the conviction that industrial capitalism would 
spread urbi et orbi, replicating in outline the central economies. 
Naturally, both outlooks differed greatly with respect to the social 
costs of transformation and its later aims, but both, and it is 
worth repeating, looked to the revolution of production forms and 
means - in fact, technical progress - to open the way to finding 
solutions to the material, institutional, and cultural impediments 
which bog down the pre-capitalist communities, or were won over by 
the preliminary phases of the evolution of the system.^/ 
Two World Wars and the major political and social upheavals of 
the first half of this century broke the illusion created in the 
nineteenth, and it became clear that, apart from a few exceptions, 
- almost all of them authentic subsidiaries of the central countries 
(such as the British Dominions) - one hundred years of laissez-faire, 
free trade, free movement of capital, and post-Napoleonic international 
order had not succeeded in imposing that orientation which was supposed 
to aim at the general and increasing participation in the potential 
fruits of relentless technological advance. Quite the opposite, it 
had underlined even more the centre-periphery dichotomy; the 
traditional functions in the international division of labour remained, 
and the contrasts in the standards of living and growth dynamics 
were heightened. 
V See, for example, the following quotation: "With the rapid 
improvement of the means of production and with communication 
made infinitely easier, the bourgeois class is bringing 
civilization even to the most uncivilized nations. Cheap 
goods are its heavy artillery with which it brings down all 
the walls of China and forces the most recalcitrant barbarous 
xenophobia to capitulate. All nations are forced to adopt, 
under penalty of passing away, the bourgeois methods of 
production and are compelled to accept so-called civilization, 
that is to say to become bourgeois. In brief, it creates a 
world in its own image and likeness'1. Marx and Engels, 




In spite of the evidence, there was no excess of economic 
analyses or diagnoses of this situation. Convincing proof of 
this is to be found, to a large extent, in the legal and 
institutional structure established after the Second World War, 
the main aim of which was to resuscitate the rules of the game of 
the pre-war international order and ensure that they were respected. 
Likewise, in other strongholds, political statements were predominant 
in which everything turned out to be attributed to the imperialist 
relations between the centre and the periphery. 
The situation was, of course, much more complex and many 
outstanding individuals contributed to its simplification. A just 
and correct account of all their efforts is impossible, but it is 
no boast to say that the basic documents of ECLA and, of course, 
the personal contribution of Dr. Raul Prebisch, are part of this 
effort.2/ 
2/ See, in particular, ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America, 19^9; 
Raul Prebisch, "The Economic Development of Latin America and 
some of its principal problems", 19^9» and "Practical and 
theoretical problems of economic growth", 1952. 
By way of illustration of the heterodoxy of ECLA criteria 
compared with the traditional school of thought a further 
quotation is recalled: 
"The relatively slow rate at which modern technique has 
spread throughout the world and the way its benefits are 
distributed have led to considerable differences in the 
per capita income and productivity of the various economic 
regions of the world. There are, of course, natural forces 
at work which tend gradually to level these differences, 
though regarded from a historical point of view they are 
perhaps still too slow. On the other hand, there is a school 
of thought which believes in the free play of these forces and 
builds an abstract world wherein the mobility of the factors 
of production and their free and easy displacement play a 
decisive role. The premise of these abstract views does not 
coincide with realities obtaining in the economic world, as 
they in fact appear to us. This tendency toward the relative 
levelling of incomes, which would offer similar opportunities 
for increasing productivity in the different international 
sectors is, in fact, a fallacy; there is not even an approach 
to any levelling such as is propounded by these theorists." 
(ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America, 19^9; op.cit., page 7k.) 
/A detailed 
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A detailed examination of the new ideas on the matter under 
discussion falls outside the scope and aims of this paper» But in 
connexion with the central idea being developed, an attempt to 
summarize the ideas of ECLA on technical progress and the operation of 
the centre-periphery system is indispensable. 
As can be appreciated in the quotation reproduced, first, the 
"varying degrees of intensity" are contrasted with the spread of 
"Western methods of production", with the "slow and irregular" pace 
at which this process has been transferred "from the countries where 
it had its source to the rest of the world". From this, therefore, 
derives (contrary to the assumption made in the nineteenth century) 
the tendency for progress to be concentrated in the advanced pole, 
with the result that "the vast and heterogenous peripheral areas of the 
new system shared only to a slight extent in the improvement of 
productivity". In brief, concentration, on the one hand; 
marginalization (relative or absolute) on the other.3/ 
To what should this development be attributed? To two factors 
principally. On the one hand, to the different structural profiles 
predominating in the Centre and at the Periphery. The features of 
industrialized economies are diversification of their productive 
machinery, their internal integration, their relative homogeneity, 
their specialization in manufactures in world trade, and their 
status as international investors and creditors - all of which 
leads to high levels of income and a high capacity to accumulate and 
create science and technology 
3/ For an up-to-date review of this subject, see ECLA, Economic 
Survey of Latin America? 1971, United Nations publication, 
Sales NQ: 73.H.G.1, Part I. 
b/ These economic features at most claim to summarize what the 
central countries are like, and do not in any way claim to 
give reasons for their being so - for such a purpose other aspects 
would have to be taken into consideration, which in many cases 
played a more decisive role than the strictly economic ones. 
Neither is there necessarily any direct or causal relation 
between the two sets of features, the basic ones and those which 
appear to result. Of course, there are mutual and circular links 
between them. In the final analysis, this is the so-called 
"virtuous circle of wealth". 
/It would 
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It would be superfluous to sketch the counter argument of the 
realities of the periphery» Let it suffice to mention that, piven 
the national or regional peculiarities, characteristics are completely 
different, and in extreme cases are the opposite. 
Further, the pattern of relations between the two spheres is 
determined mainly by their respective functions in the international 
division of labour. 
Neither is it possible or necessary to dwell any further on 
the subject. Let us bear in mind only the basic thesis on the 
deterioration in the terras of trade in the economies exporting 
primary products.5/ This argues, as is known, that this machinery 
enables the central countries to appropriate a variable share of 
the gains in productivity in the exports from the periphery.6/ 
It is important to note that the structural contrasts and 
the consequences of the different forms of specialization in the 
international economy (e.g., the deterioration in the terms of 
trade) are complementary but different facets of the existence and 
operation of the centre-periphery system. In other words, the 
5/ For an analysis of the problem in the light of the recent 
increases in the prices of primary products, see ECLA, Economic 
Survey of Latin America, 1973, E/CN.52/97^, Santiago, Chile, 
July 1974, Part I. 
6/ On this, see, among others: P. Prebisch, "Economic Development in 
Latin America and some of its principal problems", op.cit., 
page k and subsequent pages. 
With respect to the relative significance of this means of 
imposing a levy vis-k-vis financial transfers in the form of 
foreign investments (a matter which has given rise to several 
discussions), the following calculation included in the 
Economic Survey of Latin America, 1971, chapter 2, should be 
noted. Comparing the. losses resulting from the worsening of 
the terms of trade in the five-year period 1966-1970 with the 
corresponding payments in respect of profits and interests on 
direct investment, it can be seen that the former were in the 
region of 3 ^00 million dollars whereas the latter only 
amounted to 1 600 million dollars in the same period. 
/concentration of 
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concentration of technical progress (and its fruits) in the central 
economies and the relative marginalization of the periphery in this 
respect, stem primarily from the difference in the structural profiles 
already mentioned. The behaviour of relative prices accentuates and 
strengthens the tendency of the two spheres of the system to differ, 
and widens the gap between them, but it is not the principal cause of 
the situation.7/ 
The purpose of this brief account is not to call attention to 
the concern and general involvement of intellectual activity at 
ECLA in matters connected with technical progress. The purpose is 
a more practical one related to the aims of this paper. What this is 
attempting to show is that the analyses and discussions on science 
and technology, at least vis-a-vis the problems and tasks of 
economic and social development, cannot be separated from the overall 
context and the functioning and relations of the centre-periphery 
Bystem. Only in this way is it possible to see the deep roots of 
the so-called "technological gap" which will be discussed further on, 
and also to understand that the allied problem of the concentration 
of technical progress in the central economies and the relative 
marginalization of the periphery can only be solved in so far as it 
is possible to change the structural bases and contrasts which give 
rise to this problem, as well as the type of relationships which 
exist between the two spheres. 
7/ Putting the problem in more polemic terms it could be argued with 
justification that the exploitation of the periphery (involved 
in the trends of price relationships, including transfers in 
the form of investment) is secondary among the factors which 
determine the dynamism and growth of the central economies and 
their difference with respect to the periphery. To justify 
this it would suffice to compare the volume of internally 
generated investment with the earnings from the above mentioned 
sources. However, from the standpoint of the peripheryt the 
levy or transfer in these forms may be crucial in respect of 
its possibilities-of accumulation, the more so, if one takes 
into account its dependence on external sources for capital goods 
and foreign exchange. 
/(a) A 
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(a) A further look at the issue in the context of the 
industrialization of the periphery and new 
international links — • — — — — i 
There is no doubt that the general approach to the matter must 
be formulated in the light of the important changes brought about by 
the diversification of the productive machinery in the post-war 
decades, particularly in the relatively more developed Latin American 
economies. There are several principal aspects which require our 
attention. 
First, there is no doubt that within these economies there is 
visible evidence of the spread of technical progress, which covers 
all the sectors, mainly industry, private and public services 
connected with this activity, and to a lesser extent agriculture. 
Thus the pattern established in the "outward-directed" phase in 
which the improvements in the levels of productivity had been confined 
to the so-called exporter-importer complex was transformed, creating 
a context of "technological dualism" the intensity of which varied 
in relation to national conditions.8/ 
8/ On this, ECLA wrote, for example: "... new production methods 
tend to be adopted in activities connected in one way or another 
with the exportation of foodstuffs and raw materials rather than 
in other activities. In the performance of this function as a 
primary producer which is actually the function of Latin 
America, there was from the beginning a strict selection of 
aptitudes. Vast regions were coupled to the world economic 
system while others no less large and generally more densely 
populated ones, up to the present time remained outside the 
system...Thus in Latin America there remain extensive regions, 
with relatively large populations, in which the methods of 
working the land, and consequently the standard of living of 
the people, are essentially pre-capitalist". (SOLA, Economic 
Survey of Latin America, 19^9» op.cit., page 4). 
/Secondly, although 
Secondly, although this trend, in its inital stages (grosso 
modo up to the beginning or middle of the 1950s), continued without 
greater participation of foreign capital and initiative within the 
restrictive framework of national markets, it is clear that those 
aspects changed in subsequent periods, particularly from the second 
half of the 1960s onwards. 
On the one hand, the presence and role of foreign investment 
increased, and became of.primary importance in the new diversification 
of the productive system and particularly in the more dynamic 
activities of the industrial speotrum and complementary financial and 
commercial services. This caused a decisive bias with respect to the 
traditional fields of entrepreneurship: exports of primary goods 
and the provision of services. 
On the other hand, the foreign sector of many of these economies 
widened and became, more complex, either because of the previously 
mentioned factor, or because the growth and credits provided by the 
central countries helped to increase the flow of exports and imports, 
or because the exports of manufactures began to rise somewhat, or, 
finally, because regional and subregional agreements helped to 
overcome what, in the past, ECLA called industrialization in 
watertight compartments. This was called, in some of the more 
dynamic experiences, the "internationalization" process of the 
Latin American economies. 
It would be absurd to deny the importance of this and other 
associated mutations, all the more so in the face of the major 
criticisms as regards the disadvantages and limitations of the old 
system of international relations. While before there was strong 
opposition to foreign capital for industrial development and for 
investment in activities in the domestic market, the opposite was 
now clearly the case, and not only for the manufacture of cosmetics 
or mineral water. While in the past the absence of adequate means of 
channelling technological progress from the central economies to this 
part of the periphery was a source of complaint, now, mainly through 
international enterprises, a transmission belt seems to have been 
established which has considerably improved the situation. Further 
examples could be quoted in this respect. 
/However, the 
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However, the recognition and evaluation of these changes does 
not cancel but rather reinforces the need for a critical reappraisal 
of the new situation, to ensure that the old patterns are not 
reimposed out of their historical context, and that they reflect the 
reality of the last decade. 
Concern with the intensity, quality and conditions of the 
transfer of technical progress, and the clearly unsatisfactory 
state of affairs with regard to national or regional creation and 
adaptation of science and technology, is evidence of the fact that 
the changes recorded fell far short of satisfying Latin American 
aspirations in this respect. This is dealt with in other parts of 
the present document and in other papers submitted at the Mexico 
Conference.9/ For this reason we did not dwell on these aspects, 
although they are taken up in the following discussion. 
What is of prime concern here are the criticisms on the scope 
and tendencies of the spread of technical progress which this new 
stage of productive diversification has brought in its train, as 
well as its social implications. 
Getting to the heart of the matter, the fact is that in recent 
times doubts have increased with respect to the capacity of the 
process to extend to the whole body economic and, in this way, to 
produce an integrated and homogeneous system which would establish 
conditions for the effective and equitable participation of the 
large majority of the population. 
In fact, without going so far as to deny the changes mentioned 
previously, it seems clear that the extension of domestic gains in 
productivity was limited mainly to certain metropolitan or urban 
areas, to specific regions, and to all private and public enterprises 
which form the so-called "modern stratum" of these economies. 
9/ See Joseph Hodara, "Latin American experience in the promotion 
of scientific and technological development", Draft, SINT-7V0, 
July 197^; and ILPES documents. 
/The background 
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The background to this basic situation is well known and 
there is no possibility of reproducting it here in detail.10/ 
However, the dimensions of the problem are worth bearing in mind. 
In line with the estimates on the Latin American situation as a 
whole, the so-called modern stratum or sector probably employs 
approximately 15 per cent of the active population and generates 
more than 60 per cent of total production. At the other end 
of the spectrum of regional productivity would be found the 
activities of the "primitive" or subsistence stratum, which still 
absorbs more or less one third of the labour force although its 
contribution to the product is less than 10 per cent. If we 
compare the productivities per employed worker we are likely to 
find that that of the modern sector is approximately six times 
higher than the average for the whole economy, whereas that of 
the "primitive" sector is less than one fifth of this avergage. 
This situation, of course, clearly contrasts with the relatively 
homogeneous profile of the industrialized economies and also, 
incidentally, with the under-developed systems, in which a kind 
of "homogeneity in poverty" stands out. 
The emerging situation has meant discarding - at least in the 
relatively more developed economies and those at an average stage 
of development - the scheme of technological dualism which might 
smack of the past, and taking a new approach to a more complex 
situation of structural heterogeneity. This term as explained in 
the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1973, refers to situations: 
10/ On this subject, see, in particular, ECLA, Economic Survey 
of Latin America, 1968, United Nations publication, 
Sales NQ: E.70.II.G.1, chapter I, page 20 et seg; Economic 
Survey of Latin America, 1969, United Nations publication, 
Sales NQ: E.7I.II.G.I, Part Two, page 26 et seg; Economic 
Survey of Latin America, 1970, United Nations publication, 
Sales NQ: E.72.II.G.1, Part Two, page 42 et seg; Latin 
America and the International Development Strategy: 
First Regional Appraisal. E/CN.12/947 and Add.1. 1973. Part 
One; Economic Survey of Latin America, 1973, op.cit., Part Three. 
/"... of 
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"... of wide differences in productivity or "modernity" between 
as well as within sectors of economic activity, but accompanied 
by Complex ties of interchanges, dominance and dependence 
within a national socio-economic "structure", as opposed to 
presumed "dualistic" situations in which two socio-economic 
structures - nmcdern!: and "traditional" or "primitive" -
co~«xist in a national territory with only limited 
interchanges and little influence on each other."1.1/ 
Inevitably, as a result of the particular heterogeneity of 
the productive activities - and although this is not, of course, 
the only factor which has some incidence on the matter - the 
fruits of the process tended to be reserved for those having the 
closest organic ties with the productive and territorial centres 
11/ Dwelling a little oil the above definition, "those activities 
which are considered modern are those which, in general operate 
with relatively efficient forras of organization, in which 
the capital investment per person employed and the resulting 
productivity are comparable or similar to those obtaining in 
industrialized economies. Activities of this type are found 
in the various economic sectors as traditionally defined. 
Thus, for example, in this sense, a big share of export 
agriculture is modern so too is industry organised in units 
of a given size, as well as some financial establishments 
and institutions, sSo- At the ci&or ead of tha acale, the 
primitive stratum covers subsistence agriculture and numerous 
urban activities providing goods and services in which 
productivity is low, and in which there is no mechanization, 
and fixed capitc.1 is insignificant. Between both these 
extremes there is the intermediate stratum in which technical 
progress and productivity are average". The following 
criteria were used in classifying economic activities 
according to productivity strata: "level of productivity of 
labour, relative efficiency within the branch, capital 
intensity, size of enterprise and establishments, the degree 
of organization and integration, the degree of mechanization 
and technological level, the level of education and the 
degree of professional specialization of the labour force, as 
well as other complementary criteria". ECLA, "Naturaleza de las 
estimaciones sobre la distribución de la fuerza de trabajo, 
según estratos de productividad", Santiago, November 1970, 
pages 3 and 7. 
/of the 
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of the modern stratum.12/ In other words, a partial and selective 
diffusion of technical progi"ess has produced a new form of 
concentration of this progress and, what is more important, of its 
fruits. The relation between these two aspects can be seen very 
clearly by examining the nature of the goods and services which 
are given priority in production in the modernized sectors. In 
general, these tend to satisfy, directly or indirectly the consumption 
requirements of the higher income groups. By way of -illustration, 
the figures in table 1 "show the participation of the various income 
groups in the consumption of the main goods and services produced. 
As can be seen, durable consumer goods, as well as basic services 
(transport and housing), are consumed mainly by the 10 per cent in 
the highest income bracket. Of course, the Latin American average 
veils many.of the differences prevailing in each country. 
Contrasting points of view 
In this respect, as is well known, there are two competing 
central points of view, with all the classic variations and nuances. 
On the one hand, there are the arguments of those who maintain that 
the restricted spread of technical progress and its benefits - and 
the type or style of development involved - do not help to open a 
way to establishing a homogeneous system to widespread social 
participation and, particularly, to finding a solution to the 
problem of the critical poverty of a large section of the population. 
On the other hand, there are those who think that the solution to 
the problem depends basically on steady and intense growth. To the 
extent that such growt^ can be maintained at sufficiently high rates 
and for sufficiently long periods those objectives will be attained 
in the end, as they were in the central economies. This has been 
called the trickle-down effect. 
12/ The so-called urban peripheries or "marginal" populations, 
wnich make up what is called "urbanized poverty", form types 
of non-integrated or partially or precariously integrated 
enclaves in the urban centres. 
/Table 1 . 
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Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA:a/ SHARE OF TEE VARIOUS POPULATION STRATA 





Consumer itemsN, 20% 
Food, beverages 
and tobacco 5 
Clothing 2 
Housing b/ 2 
Transport 1 


























































Source: ECLA estimates on the basis of national surveys» 
a/ Estimated average based on information provided by Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Honduras and 
Venezuela. 
b/ "Housing" includes: rents, household textile articles, fuel, 
electricity, gas, water, and household supplies. 
/ I t i s 
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It is not possible to reproduce the whole chain of arguments 
and counter arguments» As any analysis projected over time, decisive 
answers are avoided for it is difficult to demonstrate the validity 
of forecasts of future trends. Such is the case, for example, in 
respect of the main contention of the first line of thought that, by 
its very nature, the present growth pattern could not attain the 
steady and necessary growth rates over the long period required to 
attain the objectives sought. A similar objection is that the possible 
flaring up of social tensions would impede progress in this direction 
or would make it impossible for a suitable period to elapse so that 
this form of growth could show its full potential.13/ In both 
cases - as in other similar ones - there is no question of a final 
veredict. 
However, available information justifies the investigation of 
prospects and reasonable alternatives, at least for the region as a 
whole, in which, naturally, the situation of a few of its major 
economies, such as Brazil and Mexico, exercise considerable 
influence. 
This is done in Chapter II of the present document. As can 
be seen, the simulation exercises carried out leave no tloubt with 
respect to two things: (a) the manifest obstacles which lie in the 
way of the prevailing pattern of development perpetuating itself, 
even taking a rather optimistic outlook; and (b) the improbability 
that the tendency to the concentration of technical progress and 
its fruits will change. 
Similar conclusions stem from the experience of the past 
decade, particularly in respect of the trends in the distribution of 
income. 
13/ On this question, see remarks contained in the Economic 
Survey of Latin America, 1973, op.cit., Part III. 
/If we 
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If we adopt the justifiable criterion that there are clear, 
though not exactly symmetrical relationships between the concentration 
of technical progress and the more or less polarized structure of 
income, the changes in the latter would reveal some significant 
indications of the degree of diffusion of the improvements in 
productivity. 
Table 2 shows some principal data on the question and gives an 
approximate picture of the changes which occurred between 1960 and 
1970 in the participation of the different social groups in the 
income of the region. 
If we look first at the lower half of the distribution pyramid, 
it is easy to see that practically no change occurred in the 
participation of the 50 per cent in the lowest income bracket, as 
well as in that of the sub-groups corresponding to the poorest 
30 pes- cent and the 20 per cent in the immediately higher bracket. 
On the other hand, however, there have been small absolute increases 
in each one of the groups, although the group which corresponds to 
the poorest 30 per cent shows a lower increase than the average 
(19.7 per cent compared with 27.5 per cent of the total) and a 
minimal absolute increase (12 dollars per capita in the decade). 
However, the 20 per cent immediately above showa a percentage 
improvement higher than average (40 per cent compared with 
27.5 per cent) and a per capita increase of 56 dollars in 1970, a 
figure comparable with that of the whole population, which is 
95 dollars. 
With respect to this part of the structure, therefore, it can 
be seen that there is virtual immobility in the income status of 
the poorest 30 per cent and a small improvement in the 20 per cent 
in the bracket immediately above, whiüh enabled it to increase its 
per capita income from 140 dollars to 196 dollars between 1960 and 
1970. In any event, it should be noted that this modest increase 
did not change the fact that on the whole the poorest 50 per cent 
only managed to maintain its share of total income. Although 
this enabled it to increase its per capita income by 32.6 per cent, 
it only meant, in 1970, 30 dollars more per year. 
/Table 1 . 
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Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA: PER CAPITA INCOME IN DOLLARS AT I960 PRICES 
AND CHANGES IN THE SHARE OF THE VARIOUS SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
STRATA IN THE TOTAL INCOME OF THE REGION 
Per capita 
Share in the income in 
total income dollars at 
of each group I960 prices a/ 









Poorest 30 per cent 5.3 5.0 61 73 19.7 12 
Next 20 per cent 8.1 8.9 l4o 196 40.0 56 
Poorest 50 per cent 13.4 13-9 92 122 32.6 30 
Next 20 per cent 14.1 13»9 243 306 25o9 63 
The 20 per cent below 
the highest 10 per cost 24.6 28.0 424 616 45.3 192 
Highest 10 per cent 47.9 44.2 1 643 1 945 17.7 292 
Highest 5 per cent 33.4 29 o9 2 305 2 630 l4ol 325 
Total 100.0 100.0 440 27.5 95 
Source: ECLA estimates on the basis of national surveys. 
Note: The estimates of the average distribution for Latin America 
in 1970 are based on information provided by Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Honduras and 
Venezuela* 
a/ This corresponds to per capita income in dollars at i960 
prices. Taking the internal depreciation of the dollar 
between I960 and 1970 to be approximately 32 per cent, it 
can be said, subject to the pertinent reservations, that 
the per capita income for the region in 1970, expressed 




The changes seem to be more significant with respect to the 
50 per cent making up the upper income brackets. Although the 
percentage share on the whole did not, of course, show any change, 
there were more marked changes within the group. 
It can be seen, immediately, that there has been an increase 
in the share corresponding to the 20 per cent immediately below the 
top 10 per cent, from 24.6 per cent 'to 28 per cent. This represents 
the highest increase in per capita income (45.3 per cent compared with 
the global average of 27.5 per cent), and an absolute increase of 
192 dollars in 1970 (compared with 95 for the entire population). 
Meanwhile, it can be seen that the 20 per cent immediately above 
the poorest 50 per cent more or less maintained its relative 
position and showed an absolute increase of only 63 dollars at the 
end of the period, an amount similar to that received by the 
group corresponding to the 20 per cent immediately following it in 
the distribution structure (56 dollars). 
On the other hand, what may prove surprising at first sight, 
both the highest 10 per cent and highest 5 per cent experienced a 
drop in their share and, similarly, increases in their per capita 
income are lower than those of the total population (17.7 per cent 
and 14.1 per cent respectively, compared \irith 27«5 per cent). 
However, this fact loses much of its significance if it is 
remembered that the absolute changes in income meant an increase 
of 292 and 325 dollars for each of these groupss compared with 
the average improvement of 95 dollars, and with the 30 dollars 
which were received by the poorest 50 per cent and the extra 
12 dollars received by the 30 per ceht at the base of the pyramid.14/ 
14/ ' In this case, tho absolute increase of the highest 10 per cent 
is almost 31 per cent cf the total. The 20 per cent 
immediately below this 10 per cent accounts for 40 per cent 
of the total, i.e., both these groups account for more than 
70 per cent. However, the respective share of the poorest 
50 per cent is a little less than 16 per cent. As can be 
seen, these differences are cf fundamental importance for 
the structure of demand and the corresponding allocation 
of productive resources. 
/In any 
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In any e v e n t , i n an o v e r a l l a p p r a i s a l , t h e v a r i a t i o n s mentioned 
show a c e r t a i n l a c k of c o n c e n t r a t i o n a t the apex which, though 
r e l a t i v e , i s not without s i g n i f i c a n c e and c l e a r l y favours t h e 
20 per cent immediately below the h i g h e s t 10 per c e n t , without 
modifying the marked a b s o l u t e advantages o f the h i g h e s t income 
groups»-
T h i s i s not the p l a c e t o go i n t o a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s o f t h e 
n a t u r e and i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e s e m u t a t i o n s . 1 5 / What i s important 
i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n i s t o show t h a t t h e new v a r i e t y o f development 
h a s had very l i t t l e e f f e c t on income l e v e l s and, by e x t e n s i o n , on 
t h e l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f a l a r g e p a r t o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
t h e poor© £3 t t h i r d . 
2 . C o n t r a d i c t i o n s , r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f t e c h n i c a l p r o g r e s s 
The f o r e g o i n g l e a d s us t o a number o f moot q u e s t i o n s 
r e g a r d i n g t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e , r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f 
t e c h n i c a l p r o g r e s s i n economical and s o c i a l development. 
As has a l r e a d y been seen from ECLA's e a r l i e s t s t u d i e s , few 
approaches t o the p r o c e s s o f development f a i l t o draw a t t e n t i o n 
t o i t s v i t a l r o l e , e s p e c i a l l y i f c o n s i d e r e d i n i t s widest sense 
which i n c l u d e s p r o g r e s s i n o r g a n i z a t i o n and in t r a i n i n g and 
management. 
However, c u r r e n t o p i n i o n a l s o r e f l e c t s a more c r i t i c a l and 
somewhat d o u b t f u l view o f i t s s o c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . 
T h i s ambivalent a t t i t u d e i s no doubt i n s p i r e d by t h e 
r e a l i z a t i o n o f t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s t h a t a r e i n h e r e n t i n t h e 
development o f s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n o l o g i c a l p o t e n t i a l . The 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h i s and the d e s t r u c t i v e a r t s o f wars and 
c o n f l i c t s i s o f course t h e f i r s t and i n c r e a s i n g l y a la rming r e a s o n 
1 5 / As r e g a r d s the concomitant changes r e l a t e d t o t h e s t r u c t u r e 
o f employment, see Economic Survey o f L a t i n America, 1973 , 
op. e x t . , P a r t I I I . 
/ f o r such 
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for such suspicions. There are others, however, that are not so 
patent and dramatic but are recognized to be of enormous importance 
for the future of mankind, such as its repercussions on the environment 
and quality of life, the distortions of an "economy of waste" and 
the futuristic (and pessimistic) picture of a cybernetic society. 
So far, these views have naturally mainly been prevalent in 
industrialized countries. The countries on the periphery, on the 
other hand, continue to adopt a much more optimistic and uncritical 
attitude towards the significance and contribution of technical 
progress. The reasons for this are also obvious, since they are 
the reflection of a lower level of development and of the obviously 
attractive image that the central economies continue to project for 
most people. 
It is easy to see, however, that countries such/as ours have 
already suffered some of the harmful effects of technological 
progress, such as the extraction on a massive scale, and sometimes 
the disappearance, of non-renewable natural resources; other 
consequences, such as urban congestion and all its implications, 
are still at an early stage. Although still in their adolescence 
in terms of modern techniques, these countries suffer from many of 
the adult complaints of the industrial or post-industrial civilizations, 
as they are sometimes called. 
The main point of this critical reappraisal should be to 
avoid any kind of technological or technocratic "fetishism" by 
which it is assumed that the major problems challenges and tasks 
of social development can be resolved only, or to a very large 
extent, by means of a greater injection of transferred or created 
technical progress - modifying the volume of resources allocated 
to research and development, improving the terms of acquisition 
and servicing or establishing an appropriate institutional framework. 
These are all legitimate and desirable objectives but, although 
necessary, they are not sufficient in the long run. 
/At the 
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At the same time, it would be equally or more mistaken to 
suggest, as some do, that technical progress per se is responsible 
for the shortcomings and problems of both industrialized and developing 
economies. 
It is neither the one nor the other; neither the philosopher's 
stone nor the root cause of all contemporary ills. This of course 
does not mean that it is not decisive in the general course of 
events or an influence on the appearance or accentuation of many 
serious problems. 
In fact, leaving such considerations aside, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that the whole matter depends on the social 
and institutional framework in which technical progress takes 
place; that is to say, that the fundamental issue is for what, 
for whom and how the potential for technological progress is 
employed and mobilized. 
The experience of Latin America referred to above is a case 
in point. 
As has been seen, the increased intensity and spread of 
improvements in productivity did not do away with, and occasionally 
actually accentuated, some of the old problems of regional evolution: 
for example, inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral disparities, 
urban-rural and regional imbalances, unequal distribution of income, 
shortage of employment opportunities and transitory or structural 
tendencies towards external disequilibrium. 
However, this state of affairs can obviously not be attributed 
solely or principally to scientific and technological absorption, 
although it is probable that the latter contributed to some degree 
and in some way to it. Several analytical studies by ECLA, it 
might be mentioned, long ago drew attention to a number of basic 
incongruities of the transfer of technology with the situation 
prevailing in these adolescent economies.16/ 
Regarding these incongruences of modern productive techniques 
with levels of income and savings, note the following: "When 
the great modern industrial centres were in a position comparable 
to that of present-day peripheral areas, and the per capita 
income in these centres was relatively low, productive (cont.) 
/16/ (cont.) 
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(cont.) technique also required only a relatively small capital 
investment per man. Careful study shows that savings are neither 
great nqr small of themselves, but only in relation to the 
density of capital, determined by technical progress. In this 
sense, savings in Latin America are, on the whole, very small 
in comparison with the requirements of modern technique. 
Certainly in the early stages of the Industrial Revolution of 
the great centres, voluntary savings were not very great 
either, but neither did technique at that time require the 
large capital coefficient per man needed nowadays. Technical 
improvements were only brought into use as increases in 
productivity, income and savings made them economically 
possible and practical. In other words, one must go back 
several decades, if not a whole century, to find per capita 
incomes equivalent to those generally obtaining in Latin American 
countries nowadays. 
"In that period, capitalist technique was still in the first 
stages of its development, whereas nov/ it manifests itself in 
a high degree of capitalization, not easily within the reach 
of the scanty savings that can be put aside out of the low 
incomes prevalent in Latin America. It follows, therefore, 
that the later modern technique is introduced into a peripheral 
country, the sharper will be the contrasts between its low 
total income and the large amounts of capital necessary to 
increase this income rapidly; so that, had similar contrasts 
appeared in the development of the great centres, they would 
have been less sharp than those observed now. 
"Consequently, countries which have recently begun their 
industrial development have, on the one hand, the advantage 
of finding a degree of technique in the great centres which 
required time and sacrifice to acquire; but on the other hand, 
they encounter all the disadvantages inherent in lagging 
behind in the course of evolution." (ECLA, Economic Survey of 
Latin America, 19^9» op. cit., page 63.) 
With regard to the relationship between technical progress 
and the supply of manpower, consider the following: "The 
diffusion of modern productive technique thus gives rise to 
a paradox. Countries having an abundant labour force and a 
scarcity of capital are faced with a form of productive 
technique of which one of its predominant traits, especially 
in the United States, is the saving of as much labour as 
possible, by means of .increasing the capital outlay per worker. 
Undoubtedly technical progress also seeks to increase the 
volume of production per unit of capital, whilst reducing the 
amount of labour required. However, though these two aims call 
for increasing capital investment per gainfully employed person, 
and though in the abstract they may be considered separately, 
technical development has linked them in such a way that, as 
a- rule, it would be impossible to break down investments into 
the part which is aimed at increasing production per unit of 
capital and that which is directed towards saving labour ... 
In view of the fact that these aims have been achieved (cont.) 
/As already 
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kB already mentioned, the reason for this lies in the styles 
of growth pursued or selected by the countries, which have 
established the pattern and destination of technical progress. 
In other words, an implicit or explicit strategy for allocating 
resources has been reflected in another strategy for assimilating 
and utilizing technological progress. 
J6/ (cont.) simultaneously and considering the indivisibility 
of equipment, in which technical progress is embodied, the 
combinations adopted in the economy of a highly industrialized 
country, with a high per capita capital density, cannot be 
undone arbitrarily and transformed into other combinations 
which conform more closely to prevailing conditions in a 
less developed country, where per capita capital density is 
much lower.1 (Raul Prebisch, "Theoretical and Practical 
Problems of Economic Growth", op. cit., pages 48 to 49). 
Regarding the contradictions arising from the requirements 
of productive technique and the size of the markets, the 
following point has been made: "Another important consequence 
of the disparity between the degree of growth of income and 
that of productive technique is the low level of demand 
which generally characterizes the greater part of the 
Latin American populations, despite their numerical size. 
Not only does lack of capital or of skill in managing it 
stand in the way of the adoption of advanced methods of 
technique but, in addition, low demand makes it impossible 
to reap the benefits of mass production. Industrial 
development in the great centres cannot have been hindered 
by limitations of this kind. There, the originally low 
income coincided with production on a correspondingly 
small scale. This scale grew in time, as greater productivity 
raisfed incomes and, with them, demand, which in turn 
absorbed the larger, better and more varied production. 
"The situation is very different in the countries which 
are now adopting modern industrial technique. Here 
demand is low because productivity is low; this is so 
because weak demand in its turn impedes, along with 
other factors, the utilization of more advanced technique." 
(ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1949, op. cit., 
pages 63 - 64). 
/This is 
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This is not the place to unravel all the complicated historical, 
economic and socio-political factors behind the choice or pursuit 
of a strategy. We are, in any case, a long way from finding a 
satisfactory theory or hypothesis on the matter.17/ 
However, this fundamental idea makes it easier to discuss the 
"responsibilities" of technical progress at a most suitable level. 
For example, it could be argued that technological policy or 
absorption has (or has not) entirely fulfilled its function in 
respect of the intensity, cost or rationality of measures taken 
within the social context, but it would certainly be a mistake to 
blame it for the problems identified or for the lack of attention 
to, or consistency with, community objectives that are not to be 
found or do not receive priority attention in national development 
strategies. 
From this standpoint, therefore, the alternative technological 
policies would be quite clear. So long as the style of development 
remains the same, they should, as far as is essential, be adjusted 
to it and fulfill the tasks set as efficiently as possible. If, 
on the other hand, they are intended to operate in another manner 
Of course, the mere suggestion that income is very badly 
distributed glosses over the fact that this situation was 
also a prime factor in the experience of the industrialized 
economies, in addition to the fact that this concentration 
of income is to some extent a consequence of the situation 
that accompanies the assimilation of technical progress. 
The analysis will have to take into account other particular 
aspects of so-called "peripheral oapitalism", such aa 
the backwardness of the agricultural sector that has gone 
hand in hand almost everywhere with the retention of a large 
segment of the population, and the contradiction between 
the pattern of consumption of a wealthy industrialized 
society that spreads only to a limited part of the 
population, the allocation of resources that this implies 
and the fact that average income or that of most of the 
population is low. 
/and in 
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and in terras of other objectives, it is a sine qua non that these 
new objectives should be specified in a new economic and social i y 
strategy. 
In both cases, it could be maintained that technical progress 
is a dependent variable. However, the term is not very satisfactory 
in that it suggests a passive or reflective phenomenon. In fact, 
it is neither the one nor the other, for the simple reason that 
there are reciprocal influences between the style of development 
and the technology - even though the former may be the dominant 
element. Just as it can quite rightly be.said that the forms of 
technical progress have contributed ,sto some degree'1 and "in some 
way" to the presence and even the accentuation of certain key 
problems of Latin American growth, it can also be argued that it 
could help to attenuate them and bring about another pattern of 
development. 
The matter must, in any case, be looked at from the 
standpoint of the circumstances and preoccupations of Latin American 
economic policy. Whatever the emphasis, orientation and political 
and institutional framework that goes with it, an increasing concern 
is being felt in Latin America with problems that have either not 
been resolved or have been created by the dominant styles of 
development. This is apparent from public statements, in action 
plans and in discussions among influential circles. At the 
external level, it is clearly reflected in the International 
Development Strategy and in the appraisal of the Second United 
Nations Development Decade. 
From the standpoint of this document, the positive guidelines 
that derive from this critical re-appraisal are quite clear. The 
centripetal forces encouraging the concentration of technical progress 
and of its benefits must be replaced by a sustained incentive to 
spread outwards, tending towards the" homogenizatian of the productive 
system towards a marked attenuation of desequilibria between regions 
and between the urban and rural areas, towards internal integration, 
towards new, less precarious and more fruitful external relationships 
and, finally and above all, towards a better distribution of income. 
/This being 
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This being so - whatever one's views or forecasts regarding 
the action that would eventually be taken as a result of these 
preoccupations - it is obvious that technological policy should 
not wait passively for the complete definition of a new approach 
to development but should already start establishing the basis of 
its own reorganization» 
For this, it is essential to make a critical analysis of . 
certain fashionable attitudes in Latin America. The following 
chapter attempts to do this. It is also essential to give a 
broad outline of alternatives for the future according to the 
style of development adopted by the region. This is dealt with 
in Chapter II. Finally, a rough outline is needed of a technological 
policy that reflects the awaited new directions and responsibilities. 




DIAGNOSES OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL PROBLEM 
There has been a substantial increase in the rate of 
importation of new techniques, notably linked to industrialization and 
urbanization, in Latin America since World War II in comparison with 
earlier eras. The flow has been mainly in the form of foreign 
equipment, product designs, technical assistance, contracts with 
foreign firms, and direct private foreign investment. 
Industrialization strategies that virtually all Latin American 
countries pursued with varying degrees of intensity in this period, 
initially viex^ed this sort of acceleration of technological importing 
as one of the key benefits from industrialization. The implicit 
assumption was that as economies industrialize they pass more 
or less spontaneously through succesive phases of rising 
technological capability which allegedly replicate the experiences 
of successful late-industrializing economies of Europe, North 
America and, more recently, Japan. 
That is to say, there would be a progressive movement from a 
Phase I, where copying foreign technologies is the rule, to a Phase II, 
in iiihich producing units develop an enhanced capability for creatively 
modifying the imported technology, to a Phase III, in which the late-
industrializer becomes a technological innovator on a sufficiently 
wide scale to engage in mutual international trading of techniques 
with other advanced economies. 
Tliis optimistic perspective has now given way to widespread 
concern that Latin American countries, despite a substantial advance 
in industrialization, show little sign of moving out of Phase I, 
technological dependency. This is not to say that there has been no 
flexibility in the selection and use of imported technology, but 
rather that flexibility has been, limited mainly to simpler adaptations 
of the following sort: 
/(i) many 
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(i) many firms in adding nev; imported product lines and processes 
have imported second-hand equipment; 
(ii) auxiliary aspects of production, notably materials handling, 
are !tdemechanizedi;, that is, made more labour using than is the norm 
in advanced economies from whom the central processes are imported; 
(iii) over time some machine shops, initially established to 
repair foreign equipment, have moved on to producing replacement 
parts and simpler equipment items locally. The larger of these have 
subsequently moved on to producing more complex equipment, but 
under foreign license; 
(iv) poorer or more uneven quality of some local materials have 
forced firms in some instances to make trouble-shooting type 
adjustments in the central processes in order to minimize lost time 
from breakdowns; 
Cv) some smaller firms have become adept at pirating foreign-
designed products for local production. 
None of these or other adjustment efforts have, however, 
generated a significant movement by firms toward local product 
innovation or sustained process redesigning to better fit local 
labour and resource supplies. 
Concern that Latin American economies remain mired in Phase I 
has been greatly sharpened by concurrent disappointments over other 
socio-economic trends. Reference'has already been made to the 
unsatisfactory structure of the changes in income distribution. 
Similar criticisms extend to other aspects, such as employment, 
the effects on the balance of payments, increasing dependence on 
foreign industrial investment, and the brain drain. 
Awareness that technological defects have contributed to the 
development of those problems is also being manifested in other ways. 
Conferences on Latin American science, technology and development, the 
formation of CONACYTS, technology documentation centres and a growing 
volume of critical books and articles on the matter attest to this 
recognition. There is not, however, general agreement on a diagnosis 
as to \ihat are' the main sources of the defects in Latin American 
/technology nor 
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technology nor on how these defects contribute to the above mentioned 
socio-economic problems. Hence there is also no consensus on 
strategies for making technology an effective instrument for 
achieving more equitable, sustained and broad-based social and 
economic improvement. 
This document attempts to sketch such a general diagnosis. 
Its purposes are: to identify and critically appraise the major 
competing views on technological strategies current in Latin America; 
to offer a tentative view on an appropriate strategy; and to 
distinguish areas where immediate policy planning and implementation 
could be effective, from those where more difficult socio-economic 
policy shifts are a prerequisite for effective implementation. 
Three broad views on what is wrong with Latin America's 
technological performance and how to improve it can be identified. 
We call these, for short, the technological gap approach, the relative 
price distortion approach, and the lack of indigenous creativity view. 
Adherents of each of these views usually accept that there are 
elements of validity in other two, but believe their own perception of 
what is wrong and what can be done about it is the most comprehensive 
and relevant. The diagnosis in the present document recognizes the 
partial validity of the technological gap and relative price distortion 
views, but contends that at heart the problem is not simply a lack of 
knowledge and experience but also the socio-economic forces that 
filter new technological knowledge into the economy in such ways as 
to unduly retard the development of indigenous technological creativity. 
An effective long-run technology strategy for Latin American countries 
will therefore have to focus strongly on means for overcoming these 
retarding forces, rather than merely on means for disseminating 
technological information. 
1. The technological gap approach 
In this approach Phase I is viewed as appropriate for Latin 
American countries under existing circumstances. The approach 
recognizes that the socio-economic trends noted above represent very 
serious problems, but it believes that the main technological source 
/of these 
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of these problems is the inadequate rate of transfer of best-practice 
foreign technologies to the region. In its reading of the situation, 
modern activities in Latin America are still quite young and 
inexperienced. Their main needs are for much greater exposure to 
imported technology and organization, and more production and marketing 
experience. Its reading of the economic history of earlier successful 
late-industrializers is that a long gestation period during which 
reliance was chiefly on foreign technology, was an essential 
prerequisite for establishing the conditions for passing on to Phase II 
of indigenous technological creativity. However, since the demographic 
explosion, rural-urban migration rates, and aspirations for individual 
material improvements in Latin America today are more intense than in 
the earlier experiences elsewhere, national technology policies are 
needed, their main thrust being to accelerate the importing and 
diffusion of modem technology and organizational methods. 
Specific policy proposals emphasize, therefore, the creation of 
documentation centres, technical assistance institutes, the expansion 
of science and engineering curricula in universities, etc. Concurrently, 
firms should be encouraged to expand their technological assistance and 
licensing contracts with foreign firms, and a favourable climate should 
be created to attract foreign investment in high technology activities. 
These measures to increase the inflow and dissemination of technological 
information, should be accompanied by measures to help finance the 
adoption of new equipment, particularly by small- and medium-size firms. 
In addition, since the international market for technology has strong 
monopoly elements, the state should oversee the specifications of the 
foreign contracts so as to improve the "technological terms of trade". 
A basic difficulty with the technological gap approach is that 
it is analytically very vague in its implied advice on technological 
choice. Even making the concept of a gap operational is very difficult. 
For example, if one adheres to the neo-classical school of analysis, it 
is the interest/wage ratio that determines which of an array of 
technological alternatives is best for a given economy. Since the 
interest/wage ratio will be higher in low wage than in high wage 
/economies, it 
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economies, it follows from this line of analysis that the latest 
techniques of advanced countries need not be superior to other 
techniques used by less developed countries« The weaknesses of 
neo-classical analysis of the technological choice problem is discussed 
in detail below. But its virtue is that it does recognize that the 
question of choice of techniques cannot be settled on the basis of 
purely technological criteria, but requires socio-eConomic ones; 
namely, which technique'yields the highest socio-economic payoff and 
for whom. 
The technological gap approach must thus be linked to an 
analysis of the -relative socio-economic benefits of different techniques. 
Most of the proponents of gap analysis undoubtedly have such linkages" 
in mind, but they have left them vague and underdeveloped and this 
has tended to reduce the use of the concept in Latin.America to rather 
ambiguous rhetoric. For example, it is clear that Servan-Schreiber's 
Le Defi_Americain was concerned with restoring Europe to parity in 
world power and influence with the United States by strengthening 
Europe's ability, to develop, finance and manage'high technology 
activities. Whatever one may think of the desirability of this 
politico-economic objective it does at least give form and definition 
to Servan-Schreiber's "technological gap". 
What is the implicit concern behind the use in Latin America of 
the gap concept? Surely, it cannot be similar to Servan-Schreiber's, 
since Latin America is not likely to aspire realistically to world • 
pre-eminence in power and influence in the near future«. 
Presumably, then the gaps in Latin American usage are defined 
by other implicit links between technological progress and social 
objectives, notably the goal of accelerating the region's social and 
economic development. But because the analysis of the links has been 
left underdeveloped two critical areas of ambiguity still surround the 
gap approach even under this assumption. 
One area concerns who are to be the main Latin American 
beneficiaries of the improved technological process. In analyzing 
possible styles of development, a basic distinction can be made 
/between (i) 
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beti/een (i) a development effort that concentrates on expanding 
the modern economic sector, in the hope that this will gradually 
absorb the entire labour force; and (ii) a style \irhich would 
concentrate development efforts more directly on the backward areas 
of the economy in order to advance their technological capability 
and progressively eliminate the productivity«and income gulf between 
the modern sector and the backward areas of the economy, For each 
alternative a set of technological gaps can be reasonably well 
defined. In the modern sector based style the prime gaps would be 
between, say, equipment and organization of the petrochemical or 
motor car industries in Latin America and that of the same industry 
in the centre countries. In the case of the backward sector style, 
the prime gap would be between, say, the minifuadia or artesanal 
techniques and those of high yielding small farms and workshops in 
centre countries. The concept technological gap, per se, clearly 
does not identify which of the gaps should be given top priority by 
Latin American technology policy. One of the major objectives of this 
paper is to explore the socio-economic implications and the feasability 
of the two alternative styles and to suggest implications for improving 
technology policy in Latin America. 
The second main area of ambiguity is what are to be the main 
sources of the gap closing technology under either style. 
There is probably general agreement among different proponents 
of gap closing, that since strong indigenous technical creativity is the 
hallmark of a technologically advanced society, the development of 
such a capability should also be an objective of technology policy. 
Such agreement, however, leaves policy questions concerning 
degree of emphasis and timing unclarified. One view is that the 
main emphasis for some time to come should be on augmenting the inflow 
of foreign technology. To do this technological licensing agreements 
should be encouraged and the climate for foreign investment made more 
favourable. In time this would provide the kno\\rledge and 
experiential base for entry into Phase II* The alternative is to 
try to hasten development of a capacity for indigenous creativity by 
various carrot and stick policies, the stiok being used to force a" 
gradual decline in reliance on foreign teohnology and investment 
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This document is critical of the first alternative for the 
following reasons. The first is that many Latin American industries 
are not comparative infants to the region and their technological 
sluggishness cannot therefore be attributed primarily to inexperience. 
For example, the first and second largest factory textile industries 
of Latin America, those of Brazil and Mexico, were first established 
with imported equipment and technical assistance over a hundred-
and-twenty years ago, predating Japan's first textile factories by two 
to three decades. Yet today these Latin American industries remain 
almost as dependent on foreign sources for basic equipment, new 
processes and products, and technical assistance as in their incepience. 
Whatever the reasons for this failure to generate the equipment 
backward linkages, technical creativity and organization dynamism that 
the "mother" industry of the industrial revolution was able to sett off 
in successful late-industrializers like the United States, Japan and 
France, inexperience can hardly be an important part of the explanation. 
Secondly, the diagnosis misreads the economic history of 
successful late-industrializers. Their Phase I was neither very deep 
nor very prolonged. Indigenous technological creativity emerged quite 
early in their industrialization. Some of the 19th century Latin 
American textile mills were erected with imported United States 
equipment and technical assistance which had already captured part 
of the equipment market from the pioneering British. Japan has 
reached first rank among world industrial powers, while assiduously 
excluding private foreign investment throughout its industrial upsurge. 
These experiences may not be directly transferable to another era and 
to different institutional settings, but neither is it justified to 
base national technology policies on a fictitious reading of the earlier 
experiences of successful late-industrializers. 
Finally, the diagnosis disregards powerful "systems-maintaining" 
forces in the contemporary relationship between the high-income centre 
and the countries of the periphery. Neither modern technology nor- the 
range of modern consumer goods are static in the centre countries. 
Excessive rates of inflow of new consumption styles via the 
/"demonstration effect" 
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"demonstration effect", combined with technological borrowing to 
satisfy the demand for new consumables, can result in the peripheric 
economy largely exhausting its physical and human investment capital 
in meeting the changing demands of a thin and only slowly expanding 
modern strata through continual technological imitation. Apart from 
the dubious ethics of such a development strategy, the resulting gulf 
separating that strata from the low-income mass of the society may 
not be bridgeable by "trickling down" within a politically feasable 
time span. 
These criticisms clearly imply that passage from Phase I to 
Phase II is not a spontaneous and inevitable phenomenon, but must 
be nurtured by technological policies explicitly oriented toward 
generating a capacity for technological creativity. The next section 
presents the historic case for this. That necessity and the parallel 
necessity for policy innovations to adjust to differences in external 
economic and technological environments confronting late-developers 
in each historic epoch, is analyzed in detail. Following this 
historic analysis the same general issues are discussed from an 
economic-theoretic' perspective, using a critique of neo-classical 
production and demand theory as the point of departure. 
2. The case for Indigenous creativity - an 
historical perspective 
The case for indigenous creativity is currently being advanced 
in Latin America from a variety of perspectives. The more extreme 
versions virtually reject that there are social benefits from 
importing foreign technology, seemingly favouring a policy of 
technological autarchy for the region as the antidote to excessive 
technological dependency. 
This would be counter-productive for at least two reasons. One 
is that there will always be a considerable amount of potential social 
utility from economizing on resources by exploiting knowledge developed 
elsewhere. It is rather pointless for the region to concentrate 
creative efforts on, in effect, reinventing the wheel or the electrio 
motor. Secondly, one has to begin realistic analysis and policy 
changes by taking the existing structures of production and 
/consumption attitudes 
- 3k -
consumption attitudes as points of departure. Both are deep-rooted, 
not merely in income and power relationships, but also in market 
dynamics and popular aspirations that are not easily changed. Neither 
the appropriate creative capacity nor the conciencia for accepting 
policies directed at product simplification and a slowing down of-
the rate of inflow.of modern varieties, can be achieved overnight. 
One of the benefits of serious micro-studies of the dynamic mechanisms 
sustaining Latin American structural heterogeneity and technological 
dependence could be to help enlarge popular awareness that various 
institutional changes are pre-requisites for a more socially equitable 
application of technology in many critical areas. A second benefit 
would be to identify openings within the existing socio-economic 
structures through which application of technological knowledge in 
a socially beneficial way could be instituted more immediately. 
A partial contribution to developing tha requisite conciencia 
is to demolish the comforting historic myths that help sustain the 
acceptance of technological dependence. One of these is that all 
late-industrializing countries, past and present, pass through quite 
similar sequences of socio-economic experiences on the way to full 
modernity. The second is that a long period of generalized dependence 
on imported technology and equipment, what we have called Phase I, 
has been part of the experience of all successful late-industrializers 
in the past. The first of these propositions is more misleading 
than helpful} the second has virtually no historic validity» 
The idea that economic development dynamics are basically 
replicative, a succession of similar stages on the road to full 
modernity, had wide support in the early post-war literature on social 
and economic development. This was understandable. The subject had 
burst on the scene as a major international "problem" related to 
colonial independence movements, the Cold War, and rising social 
aspirations and pressures within the Third V/o.rld. The notion that the 
past can help predict the future was ready at hand, and was seized 
upon eagerly by development analysts. 
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Unfortunately, the past is not an open book. Countries not 
only embark on late development with different initial cultural, 
institutional and natural resources configurations, but even more 
important for development analysis, each new generation of late 
developers also finds itself in an international environment with a 
rather different configuration of technologies, foreign trade, 
transport and communications, productive' capacity and military 
power than its predecessors. In the past two centuries a dominant 
force impelling changes in the international scene has been the 
accumulation of scientific and technological knowledge. The initial 
enthusiasm for replicative development models and stage theories was 
bound to stumble over this changing reality. Currently, historical 
analysis of successful late-development experiences tends to emphasize 
instead the crucial importance of unique institutional innovations 
that accelerated physical and capital accumulation, and promoted 
technological diffusion. 
The innovations are unique in two senses. They adapt many 
inherited features that are special to each country, and they are 
creative responses to the changing opportunities and constraints 
emanating from the altered external environment that each generation 
of late developing countries confronts. The successful developers 
were neither mere copiers of foreign institutions, nor did they 
permit themselves to be swept along passively by socio-economic and 
technological currents emanating from abroad. There is, of course, 
no assurance that the requisite responses will always emerge. But 
this merely accords :ith one of the few obvious lessons of history, 
that there is no inevitability about development. Despite the 
impressive international accumulation of science, technology and 
productive power, there are relatively few cases of peripheral economies 
transforming themselves into fully developed, technologically 
advanced centre countries. 
This is not to deny the partial validity of the macro-patterns 
and regularities common to socio-economic development which the earlier 
replicative models helped to elucidate. In the process ox developing, 
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the share of industrial output does rise relative to that of 
agriculture} the share of household expenditure on food does fall with 
rising household income} population does become more urbanized} death 
rates do fall before birth rates} fertility rates do decline as the 
population becomes predominantly urbanized, etc. But these macro-
regularities are more in the nature of results than causes of 
development. They are not the strategic dynamic forces that impel 
development and on which effective strategies for accelerating the 
process can be based. No strategic "take-offs" and flights into 
sustained growth can be predicted from them. 
To illustrate we examine briefly some key interrelated aspects 
of technological creativity from an historic perspective. To do this 
the development experience of the past two centuries is divided 
somewhat arbitrarily into three time spans: Period I, from around 1770 
to around i860} Period II, from around i860 to World War I, and 
Period III, from World War I to the present. The interrelated aspects 
considered are: the sources of technological creativity, economies of 
scale, the dynamics of industrial demand, marketing structures, and 
the financial requirements for industrial investment. The intellectual 
agents of technological creativity are also broadly classified as 
follows: basic scientists, applied scientists, formally trained 
engineers and technicians, amateur inventors and artisans, i.e. 
job-trained skilled workers and technicians.^/ 
(a) Late industrialization in the period 1770-1860 
For Period I, there is rather general consensus among economic 
historians that commercially applied inventions and improvements in 
Great Britain, Western Europe and the United States originated mainly 
with job-trained skilled workers and technicians. This group drew 
very little on either formal engineering recipes or on specific 
concepts emanating from basic or applied science. The intellectual 
gulf between the theoretical and practical layers of technological 
endeavour reflected the limited practicality of formal scientific and 
2 / For a more detailed treatment of the various aspects and related 
documentation, see David Felix, "Technological dualism in late 
industrializes: on theory, history and policy", The Journal of 
Economic History, vol. X3CXIV, March 1974, pp. 194-235. — — 
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engineering rules in this era. This was partly because, despite 
notable advances in the natural sciences and mathematics, the 
intermediate links between basic theory and usable technological 
prescriptions via applied science and engineering were as yet 
underdeveloped. It was also, partly, because at the "practical end, 
machine building capability of the period, despite notable advances, 
was still too crude to approximate the machine tolerances, heat 
resistance and other requirements for applying mathematicized 
engineering rules to productive processes. 
There were, of course, some initial bridges over the gulf. 
Although the theory of chemical synthesis was still working out of 
its phlogiston phase, chemical taxonomy was a rich source of 
information about materials and their properties. Physicians, whose 
formal training included chemistry, were a source of helpful chemical 
advice to industrial firms seeking alternative materials to solve 
technical problems. Another bridge was the amateur inventor, some 
of whom were obsessed by ideas emanating from a broad knowledge 
of contemporary science, although many others were haunted by notions 
emanating from more fanciful sources. The amateur inventor has always 
been more venturesome than the practical artisan, or in later periods, 
the R & D laboratory director. His failure rate is therefore always 
extremely high, but he has contributed important break-throughs; 
relatively more in Period I than in later periods when the rising cost 
Of technological search began to price him out of more and more 
segments of the technological gamut. Finally, civil and military 
engineering became professionalized and mathematicized in this period, 
more rapidly in late industrializing 'Jest European countries than in 
Great Britain, and began to supply increasingly important design 
inputs to public works and military hardware. In. general, by the 
end of Period I the bridges between science and technology were 
becoming more numerous and the gulf was narrowing. 
Great Britain was of course the main innovator of factory 
technology, machine tools, and transportation and transport equipment, 
but later industrializing continental countries and the United States 
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in this period v?ere far from mere copiers. Quite early in their 
industrialization they began developing their own machine building 
and designing capability and to adjust techniques to local materials, 
labour skils and demand peculiarities. Great Britain, with its earlier 
start and longer period of accumulation of industrial capital, 
pioneered in advancing economies of scale in a number of major areas, 
such as textiles, chemical works, iron smelting, mining and beer. 
But the United States soon pioneered in the fabricating of metal 
products using interchangeable parts, in wood working tools, and 
in assembly line techniques for meat packing and the production of 
\iood products; while France led in quality textile products and 
charcoal iron smelting technology. 
Special factors contributed to the early entry by late 
industrializers into Phase II of indigenous techonological creativity, . 
and even to an incipient entry into Phase III of technological 
exporting. One was that it was not until the 1840s that Great Britain 
repealed the last of its restrictive laws against the' export of 
machinery. Prior to that time the diffusion of British technology 
had been a semi-clandestine affair. European countries offered 
lucrative contracts to attract British artisans to build equipment and 
train local workers in priority areas. Governments of industrializing 
countries also sent missions to Great Britain to report on British 
industrial techniques, while more informal industrial spying was- still 
another transfer channel. There was, however, little in the nature of 
direct foreign investment by Britain until the railroad age of the 
mid-19th century, when British contractors for a time played an 
important role in-designing and building continental railways. 'In the 
more successful late industrializers the role was soon taken over by 
local engineers, railroad contractors and equipment firms, so that by 
the latter part of the 19th century British contractors and railroad 
equipment exporters had shifted the locus of their foreign efforts to 
to the Empire, Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America. The effort 
was now combined with loan and equity financing of the railroad 
projects. In fact, overseas railroad investment became the major 
component of British foreign investment during the latterfs heyday, 
1870-1914. /A second 
- 39 -
A second special factor allowing early entry into Phases II 
and III was the rich artisan base of the late industrializing 
countries of Period I. Since machine building and the finishing 
phases of industrial products were still primarily workshop activities, 
artisans of continental Europe and the United States were able, after 
a span of experience in operating the new equipment, to move to the 
higher technological phases of reproducing and then to modifying the 
equipment components and processes. 
However, demand factors also played a major role in stimulating 
indigenous technological creativity. In the first place, the major 
locus of demand for industrial products through most of this period, 
was, in contrast to present-day Latin America, the rural sector. It 
was not merely that the industrializing countries of Period I began 
with most of their population still engaged partly or wholly in 
agriculture, but also that agriculture had in each case embarked on 
technical progress and productivity growth. The French economist, 
Paul Bairoch, even claims as a statistical regularity that in the 
case of both Great Britain and the late industrializing countries of 
the period, an agricultural revolution began a generation or two before 
their industrial revolution.2/ 
The term revolution may be a bit strong for the rate of progress 
in the continental countries, but there is no doubt that a progressing 
agriculture in each of the countries was providing a growing market for 
industrial output. The main demand for iron and iron products prior 
to the railroad age came from agriculture, and included not simply a 
static array of traditional iron artifacts, but successively improved 
plows, harrows, mowers, threshers, and hand tools, much of which are 
of local design to fit different soil conditions, crops, etc. 
Stimulus to creativity came also from the expanding consumer 
demand for differentiated products. In contrast to later periods, 
the international component of the demonstration effect on consumption 
was still embryonic, limited mainly to the aristocratic strata of 




European society. Moreover, factory technology was still to crude 
to produce fine finished products suitable for the tastes of even 
the bourgeois classes, who at first took their canons of refined 
taste from the aristocracy, but later deviated toward the intricate 
grotesqueries that have become indólibly associated with the 
Victorian era. Thus, in contrast to Latin America today, the 
expanding demand of the higher income strata for differentiated 
products was filled by the artisan workshop. 
Even the international demonstration effect favoured the 
workshop; e.g., the production of chinoiserie for the aristocracy 
came to be mainly import substituted by local potters and furniture 
makers. In general, the chief locus of product differentiation 
competition was the workshop, which had the craft skills to produce 
fine finished products, not the factory which did not, and which could 
only undercut through lower cost production that sub-sector of 
artisanry producing intermediate materials and semi-finished goods. 
Thus, while the factory displaced the artisan workshop in some areas, 
the high income elasticity of demand of the upper income strata favoured 
the expansion of artisan workshops in quality consumer manufactures. 
There were notable differences, however, between consumer demand 
patterns of the European industrializers and the United States. In the 
former, as is the case in Latin America today, the market for 
industrial consumer goods was ove^helmingly the upper 20-30 per cent 
of households, although a much larger share of these households were 
rural than is the case in Latin America. In the United States a 
similar concentration of consumer demand was to be found only in 
the South, where slave plantation agriculturé gave latifundista 
characteristics to income distribution and consumer demand. For 
the majority of the United States population that lived outside 
the South, the penetration of industrial consumer goods was much 
deeper, reflecting a more equitable distribution of land and 
relatively high wages. Consumer"tastes tended to be more plebeian, 
favouring industrial ventures in mass production of shoes, sewing 
machines and other household artifacts. By the end of the Period I, 
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the United States had emerged as the undisputed leader in applying 
factory techniques to finished consumer goods. 
The fixed capital share-of industrial investment was very 
small in the early decades of the British industrial revolution. 
Bairoch estimates that in late l8th century Great Britain, the 
value of capital per worker in agriculture (including the value of 
land) was nine times that of industry. Equity financing of the early 
industrial ventures could thus be fairly readily supplied from 
agricultural or mercantile sources via family connexions or 
partnerships. For the later industrializing countries of Period I, 
the financial entry barriers rose, reflecting the progressive 
increase of mechanization and of minimum efficient scale, although 
Bairoch estimates that even in these countries the value of capital 
per worker remained higher for agriculture than for industry 
through Period I. 
To compensate for the rising industrial financing requirements 
and greater entrepreneurial risk, the later industrializing countries 
embarked on a number of policy and institutional deviations from the 
British model. Their trade policies were moderately protectionist, to 
shelter "infant industries" from the full blast of British competition 
until the infants reached adulthood. The main rationale \iras that 
learning by doing would gradually lead to more efficient production 
via improved labour and managerial skills and improvements in techniques 
It is interesting to note that the major economic theoreticians of 
this period made no explicit separation in their analysis of economic 
growth between capital accumulation and technical progress. The 
reason was not that they believed the technology of their times was 
static - on the contrary they were keenly aware that the "state of the 
arts" was advancing rather rapidly - but that they thought of 
accumulation and improvements in the state of the arts as inseparably 
interrelated. Their view implies a "learning by doing" explanation of 
technical progress, which for Period I, when most new technology derived 




The other institutional deviations and policy innovations 
of the late industrializers were of three major types. One was 
state transport planning combined with either direct ownership or 
subsidization of national railroad networks, as contrasted with the 
pioneering British pattern of private, piecemeal construction. A 
second was the formation of private industrial banks to supply equity 
financing and long-term credits, particularly for large-scale 
industrial ventures. These banks, similar to the Mexican financieras 
of recent years, were pioneered by the French, but spread rapidly to 
other continental countries. A third was more concerted efforts to 
finance the spread of basic education, higher technical training, 
and, in some countries, advanced scientific and engineering research 
and training institutes. The late industrializers were generally 
well ahead of Great Britain in providing popular education and formal 
scientific and technical training. Their load, however, brought only 
minor immediate benefits for their indigenous skills and technical 
creativity, the main payoff coming Period II. 
(b) Contrasts with recent industrialization in_Latin America 
These key features of the late•industrializing experiences of 
Period I differ substantially from the more recent industrialization 
pattern of Latin American countries. The latter cannot be considered 
to be broadly repeating the earlier experiences; the deviations are too 
pronounced. 
In the first place, the sustained Phase I technological 
dependency characterizing the Latin American experience was not a 
feature of the late industrializers of Period I. They passed quicly to 
indigenov.s creativity, this ability reflecting both the richness of 
their artisan skills and the relative unsophistication of technology 
in Pei-iod I. Secondly, "best practice" technology in this period 
required less fixed capital per worker and was much less scale intensive 
than today, so that the private financial barriers against adopting 
such technology were also far lower. Thirdly, in contrast to most 
industrializing Latin American countries a technically progressing 
agriculture provided a very considerable part of the demand for 
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wood products, refined metals, tools and equipment, while the demand 
for machines to equip factories and workshops was also mainly-
serviced locally by artisan type workshops. Both broad types of 
demand provided fertile seedbeds for indigenous creativity. Fourthly, 
in contrast to Latin America, the composition of the growing demand 
of the upper income strata for differentiated consumer goods in 
Period I was much less influenced by foreign canons of taste and 
status than has been Latin American demand, and: was largely met by 
local artisan creativity. 
These differences in technological experience help to explain 
why structural heterogeneity has been more pronounced in most 
industrializing Latin American countries, than it was for the Period I 
late industrializes. With agriculture progressing in closer step 
with industry than has been the case in most Latin American countries, 
the relative urban-rural per capita income differences in the Period I 
countries never reached the extremes prevalent in much of Latin America, 
In the Period I countries, and expanding artisan sector strongly 
/ 
reinforced the large factory sector in absorbing rural emigrants, so 
that the industrial share of employment tended, in contrast to the 
typical Latin American experience, to rise pari- passu with the share of 
industrial output. Finally, despite some well-publicized cases of 
artisan activities agonizingly resisting their demise before advancing 
factory competition by wage cuts, the more common situation was 
for intra-industry wage differentials between small and large 
enterprises in the Period I countries to be negligible. Workshops 
could survive and expand on the basis of a favourable demand for 
equipment and differentiated consumer products, whereas in Latin America 
the artisan type firm operates mainly in the income inelastic range 
of products and survives mainly by paying lower wages and evading 
taxes and social security payments more vigorously than the large firm. 
One other contrast is worth noting. By the second half of the 
19th century the international demonstration effect in ideas brought 
the Listian development strategies of the late industrializers of 
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Period I to the attention of some development-conscious Latin 
Americans®3/ Political efforts to get such strategies adopted, 
however, largely failed prior to the Great Depression, with some 
partial exceptions such as industrial tariff protection in Brazil 
and expanded popular education programmes in Argentina. When 
Latin American countries entered the railroad age in the latter-half 
of the 19th century, they largely ignored the transport planning of 
Period X late industrializers, opting instead for the disarticulated 
early British approach. Thus when, during the Great Depression, 
many Latin American countries belatedly began adopting a broader 
range of Listian development policies, the declining importance of 
learning-by-doing among the 20th century modes of technological 
progress, the disarticulated transport systems and the greatly 
increased financial barriers to entry in modern industries, provided 
a much stonier seedbed for late industrialization. The prolonged 
lag in adopting Listian developmentalism had made the countries 
late-late industrializers, for whom mere Listianism no longer 
sufficed, as is indicated by the contortions of import substitution 
industrialization in the region. 
<c) Industrialization during the period l860-'i9l4 
n—t~--m - -' rr"uri i n 1 *i mi r«inin . 1  urm jrr"" r "irWi« mm n n ma,K«ut*H 
Turning to Period II, broadly 1860-1914, one observes the 
following relevant changes. 
The sources of technical progress shifted increasingly to 
higher cognitive levels. Formal engineering and applied science 
began to assume strategic importance in a number of "high technology 
areas of Period II, notably, chemistry, pharmaceuticals, metallurgy 
and electric energy. As a result, invention in the high technology 
areas became more institutionalized, with full-time professionals, 
industrial research and testing labs, and with stronger intellectual 
linkages to universities and basic scientific research. Large German 
2/ The concept of state transport planning as well as "infant 
industries" and the consequent need for protection are often 
associated with the German economist F. List (1789-1846). 
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firms were the pioneers in these developments, reaping belated 
benefits from the emphasis of 19th century German development strategy 
on expanding scientific and technical education. 
Serial production of standardized tools and equipment and 
mass production of a widening range of consumer goods also 
characterized Period II«. In these product areas United States firms 
usually led in devising net/ ways of standardizing components, designing 
large specialized machines, and reorganizing the flows of parts, 
materials and work tasks on the factory floor. The "American method", 
in turn, came to be widely adopted by Europeans, including the British. 
Making possible these developments were broad advances in the tensile 
strength and heat resistance of structural materials, improvements in 
power conversion, switching, more accurate machine tools, etc. These 
innovations were essential for overcoming successive bottlenecks 
to further mechanization and the extension of economies of large scale. 
Mass production was the driving force behind the revolutionary 
changes in marketing and in the locus of product differentiation 
competition, which i-jas another major feature of Period II. At the 
beginning of the period, industrial goods were 'Still being distributed 
via two main channels. For standardized products, independent 
wholesaling firms served as intermediaries, buying from the factory and 
reselling to traders further down the distribution chain to the 
final user. The arrangement reduced working capital needs of the 
producer at the cost of an uneven flow of orders from wholesalers 
and relative anonymity for his product. The wholesaler, for whom a 
quick turnover of his heterogenous stock of goods was strategic, saw 
no profit in. singling out the products of particular producers for 
expensive market promotion. The differentiated workshop products 
- equipment and consumer specialities - were, on the other hand, 
produced often to customer order, and even the limited production 
for stock, \/as often sold directly to the final user. All this changed 
dramatically in the course of Period II under the impetus of the 
spread of mass production techniques. 
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Growing economies of mass production meant proportionately 
higher fixed expenses and hence sharply rising unit costs when 
operating below capacity. In order to sustain output runs while 
minimizing inventory accumulation, mass producers began by-passing 
independent wholesalers and to market directly on a scale 
commensurate with their output capacity. Brand names, mass 
advertising, and the creation of distributional appendages^ 
including on occasion captive retail outlets, featured the 
marketing revolution. The combining of large-scale production 
with mass marketing also originated from below, some large wholesalers 
and retail chains retaliating by establishing captive- production 
facilities. By the end of Period II the independent general 
wholesaler was fading from the scene in the industrially-advanced 
economies. 
In consumer goods, many of these efforts were initially 
directed at intermediate segments of the income hierarchy, including, 
for items like margerine, cigarettes, ]seer, canned foods, shoes 
and clothing, many low-skilled worker families. Production in 
European industrial countries by the end of the 19th century was 
beginning to follow the United States pattern, of penetrating markets 
below the higher income strata. However, in order to exploit 
economies of scale in marketing and the rising sophistication of 
factory techniques, mass producers soon began also to liiden their 
product lines and to engage increasingly in product differentiation 
competition aimed at capturing the higher income market from the 
specialist workshops. 
The marketing revolution was associated, therefore, with 
equally dramatic changes in industry market structures. Concentration 
ratios rose as the large producers pursued aggressive price cutting 
and other "cut-throat" strategies to take over or drive out smaller 
competitors. The financial ^barriers to entry or survival of small 
firms became more and more serious for to the rising capital requirement 
for producing at competitive costs i/as now added the substantial 
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capital needed to market effectively. Inexorably, the workshop 
was being displaced from its main strongholds, machine building and 
product differentiation, by the large scale producer. More and 
more of the things the workshop could do, the factory could do as well 
and cheaper. By the end of Period II the market for handcraft 
consumer products in industrially-advanced societies was being 
reduced to a limited snob market, for cognoscenti who took pleasure 
from the interesting imperfections of handcrafted goods that 
distinguished them from the monotonous regularity of machine made 
equivalents. 
With these revolutionary changes, the centre-periphery division 
emerged more sharply. At the centre was a group of technologically 
creative, capital-rich industrialized economies; at the periphery 
a larger array of technologically dependent, capital-importing 
economies. By the beginning of the 20th century, foreign investment 
was incorporating an increasing proportion of direct investment in 
petroleum, plantations, food processing and public utilities in the 
peripheral countries, except for the last,' chiefly to supply centre 
economy demand. Concurrently, the mass marketing strategies of centre 
country industrial firms was intensifying the international 
demonstration effect on peripheric consumer demand. In Period II 
this demand was met by exports. While industrial firms of the centre 
countries were beginning to place subsidiary plants, as well as sales 
agencies, in each others' markets, they limited investment in 
peripheral countries to sales agencies. The transnational industrial 
enterprise was still in its incipience; communications and transport 
barriers made efficient control difficult and subsidiary plants were 
for the most part placed only in wealthy neighbouring countries. 
Nevertheless, the present day oligopolistic industry structures 
had been largely erected in national markets by World War I, and 
various forms of non-price competition characterizing oligopolistic 
rivalry were being tested in the home markets. Underestimation of 
the expansionary dynamics of oligopolistic competition and a failure 
to foresee the growing impact of new, if still incipient, modes of 
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transport and communications on these dynamics, accounted for the 
notions prevalent in Latin America and elsewhere a few decades ago 
about the permanent improbability of foreign industrial investment 
descending on the periphery. 
(d) Successful late-lateindustrialization in Period II; the 
Japanese case ~ 
For late-late industrializes, innovative modifications of 
Listianism were required to meet the changing international 
technological and market environment of Period II. Japan's experience 
demonstrates one set of successful responses to the new environment 
by a late-late industrializing market economy. Significant for 
Latin America today are not the specific Japanese policies, which 
were neither socially optimal then nor would be as effective now in 
the changed international environment. Rather it is that the policies 
brought early attainment of technological creativity and adequate 
defenses against the international demonstration effect, both of 
which were strategic for Japanese development and are still strategic 
for Latin America in today's international environment. 
The particular modalities of Japanese development strategy were 
strongly affected by two special factors: the "Unequal Treaties", 
imposed on Japan in 1858 by a concert of European powers and the 
United States, and remaining in force until 1911? and militarism, 
whose impact on development strategy was magnified by the nationalist 
reaction to western imperialism, of which the Unequal Treaties were 
a manifestation.4/ The imposed trade liberalization of the Unequal 
Treaties is cited by some writers as the decisive factor in Japan's 
successful development, because allegedly it exposed Japan from the 
4/ The Unequal Treaties forced Japan to open its ports to trade 
""* placed a 5 per cent maximum on Japanese import duties, and 
provided for consular courts and other extra-territorial 
privileges for European and American nationals in Japan., The 
signing of the Treaties was preceded by shows of force by 
United States and European naval squadrons and an intense 
diplomatic campaign of threat and cajolery by the western powers. 
The treaties were unilaterally abrogated by Japan in 1911« For 
a detailed account of the events leading to the reluctant 
Japanese acquiescence to ,the Treaties, see W.G. Bessley, 
The Meiji Restoration (Stanford University Press, 1973)* 
Chapters 2-4. ~~ /beginning of 
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beginning of its modern development to international competition 
and forced it to fine tune technological choices to relative factor 
prices. This is largely misleading. The Unequal Treaties did prevent 
Japan from indulging in autarchical levels of tariff protection, 
Latin American style, and forced it to be more selective. But the 
serendipitous effect of the treaties was mainly to push the 
Japanese to develop more innovative control mechanisms, in order 
to get around the treaty restrictions, protect the home market and 
subsidize import substitution and exports. The military logistic factor 
in Japanese development strategy, which intensified after World War I, 
accentuated efforts to develop iron and steel, shipbuilding and 
the heavy equipment industries. But it also accounted for some of 
the harsher features of the development effort; in particular it 
retarded the penetration of modern goods and services to the mass 
of the population.J5/ 
nevertheless, by imaginative policy and institutional 
innovation the late-late industrializing Japanese did manage in a 
general way to replicate the dynamics of successful late-
industrialization of Period I. Crucial features include the following. 
Prom the beginning of the Meiji period, an intensive effort 
was made to pass from Phase I of general technological dependency 
to Phase II of indigenous creativity. To quote from a recent 
summary of the Meiji era: 
"Approximately fifty years of fervent attempts by the Japanese 
government and private industrialists to catch up with the Western 
powers at least succeeded in transplanting into Japan diverse 
manufacturing technologies as well as scientific and technical 
knowledge embodied in engineering and scientific disciplines. Since 
it took the Japanese government from 1858 until 1911 to regain its 
rights to determine import duties, the government's main weapons for 
developing Japanese manufacturing industries were limited to direct 
subsidies, legal sanctions to discourage the use of imported parts 
and machines, and more important, the building up of the general 
technological level of the nation through general and specialized 
J5/ Cf. William Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan 1868-19^8: 
Growth and Structural Change 
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education. Also, the government played a direct role in transferring 
selected manufacturing technologies to Japan by its rapid replacement 
of foreign engineers and other trained foreigners with Japanese 
nationals." 6/ 
Facilitating the selectivity of the technological effort were 
the factors that greatly limited the impact of the international 
demonstration effect on consumption preferences. In its long 
isolation from western influences, Japan had developed a rich 
cultural tradition with deeply-embedded customs and consumer styles. 
These continued to dominate Japanese household preferences, including 
those of the higher income strata until well into the post-World War II 
era, and only in the past two decades have become subordinated to 
western styles. The tenacity of the older preferences was reinforced 
by deliberate policies to retard the adoption of modern consumer sales 
promotion devices. Of particular importance were restrictions on 
the entry of foregin marketing agencies and the complete exclusion of 
direct foreign investment. The exclusion was possible, despite the 
Unequal Treaties, because western economic expansion of the mid-19th 
century focused on developing export markets (its interest- in direct 
foreign investment came much later) and the foreign promulgators 
of the Unequal Treaties did not provide for foreign investment rights. 
The Japanese authorities seized on the oversight to reject wholesale 
subsequent petitions from foreign investors. This policy has been 
cautiously modified only in the past decade, as Japanese firms 
themselves began to engage in foreign direct investment, in favour 
of reciprocal investment arrangements with the other centre countries. 
The high income elasticity of demand for product differentiation 
was thus largely serviced by the artisan sector. Prestige consumption 
items continued to be mainly of traditional design even after World 
War II. A comprehensive household expenditute survey made in 1955 
shovred that half of urban household expenditures were on items 
6/ Toshi Tsurami, Japanese Efforts to Master Manufacturing 
Technologies. ICH 14 G 45 (Boston, Mass., Intercollegiate 
Clearing House, 1970) p. 30. 
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already produced and consumed during the pre-Meiji era. The 
workshop through most of the early industrialization effort remained, 
therefore, the chief locus of consumer product differentiation 
competitions. Income elasticity of demand for its products favoured 
the growth of the workshop sectors, facilitating its capacity to 
absorb rural labour, modify and improve products and processes, and 
raise productivity. Not until after World War I did wage differences 
between small and large firms begin to diverge. This Japanese pattern, 
in other words, resembled that of the late-industrializers of Period I, 
although the social and policy mechanisms that generated the 
replication were rather different. 
Another noteworthy feature of the Japanese experience was 
its respectable rate of expansion of agricultural output and 
productivity. The productivity growth reflected innovative peasant 
efforts, supplemented by government technical assistance in crop 
selection and in developing new varieties, and by modest improvements 
of tools and implements. Agricultural growth had two major positive 
effects on industrial development. It recreated some of the market 
interfacing between agriculture and industry that was so prominent 
a feature of Period I industrialization, and it also made agriculture 
a significant source of capital, which was channeled to industry 
and other sectors, partly through land taxation, partly through 
private accumulation channels. 
Finally, there were the Japanese innovations in the financing 
and control of large-scale production and export marketing. Pioneering 
government plants were used early in the Meiji period to test risky 
waters for reluctant private entrepreneurs, although permanent 
government ownership was limited to areas of high military-logistic 
importance. The most interesting innovation in large scale organization 
was, however, the controversial Zaibatsu. The growth of this handful 
of giant conglomerates, combining banks, international marketing 
agencies, shipping lines and factories, was facilitated by 
government subsidies. The Zaibatsu provided finance, export orders, 
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quality control, and foreign commercial and technological intelligence 
to a stable of nominally independent but captive industrial clients 
in textiles and other exporting industries. 
The arrangements had the interesting side effect of minimizing 
opportunities for the captive firms to pursue domestic product 
differentiation competition. Husbanded by the Zaibatsu, the firms 
exchanged intimate information on costs, trouble-shooting solutions, 
and process and product innovations with a startling lack of concern 
for the canons of discretion common to oligopolistic competitors 
elsewhere. 
The links between the Zaibatsu and the government ministries 
were also remarkably intimate. It was through these informal links, 
rather than through formal laiirs and decrees that the government 
imposed its changing economic priorities to the private industrial 
sector. The links were used to control the order of establishment 
of new industrial activities, to promote exporting, and to mobilize 
industrial and university talent for crash efforts to solve high 
priority technological problems. The arrangements allowed the' 
Japanese government to pursue a selective strategy of allocating the 
nations's limited talent, foreign exchange, and domestic financial 
resources to building up design capability and economies of scale, 
concentrating first on a small number of activities, and expanding 
the range sequentially as resources and skills accumulated; that is, 
to replicate by other means the dynamics of industry widening 
characterizing Period I late-industrializers.7/ 
Many of these special features of Japan's earlier industrial 
effort are now being liberalized. Consumption styles are becoming 
westernized, and small-scale industry is declining in relative 
The Japanese pattern of automobilization stands in sharp contrast 
to the Latin American pattern. Pioneering efforts to produce 
Japanese trucks date back to the early 1920's. The production 
of passenger cars, however, v/as delayed until the 1950's, when 
Japanese firms entered production on a rapidly expanding scale, 
with adequate design capability, financing and plant size to 
become in a few years major competitors in international markets. 
/importance, as 
- 53 -
importance, as is Japanese dualism. Japan is reaching equality 
with older centre countries in per capita income and technological 
capacity, and is entering Phase III technological exporting. Dut 
much of the old structure of controls still remains. Despite attempts 
by the United States occupation authorities after World War II to 
dismantle the Zaibatsu, strong informal links between large industry 
and government continue to guide post-war economic policy. Foreign 
businessmen encountering these subtle obstacles refer bitterly to 
the arrangements as Japan Inc. 
Apart from the obvious fact that Japan is now approaching full 
modernity, with its special set of headaches, a number of macro-
economic contrasts between Japan during its earlier transition and 
Latin American industrializers today merit noting. In general, 
Japanese dualism was never as severe as in today's Latin American 
industrializers. Urban-rural and interregional differences in 
per capita income, and wage differentials between small and large 
enterprises, seem never to have been as great in Japan. Even during 
its period of rapid demographic growth, Japanese underemployment was 
less and the labour force participation rate higher than in most 
Latin American industrializers. Finally, and basic in accounting for 
the lesser heterogeneity, Japan generated higher rates of capital 
formation and avoided falling into the extreme state of technological 
dependency that characterizes the modern Latin American sectors. 
(e) Trends in the international industrial and technological 
environment since World War I 
Period III, from World War I tp the present, has involved 
changes in the international environment which are very generally 
known, and need not be discussed in detail here. There are three 
trends however, which have been of key importance from the present 
point of view, and need to be kept in mind. 
First, radically new transport and electronic communications 
technologies that were only in their beginning at the close of 
Period II have come to full flower in Period III. These developments 
have enormously increased the speed and reduced the cost of mass 
dissemination of images and ideas. Aided by accompanying developments 
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in advertising, public relations and marketing techniques, they have 
extended the market horizons of the large multi-national firm to 
encompass the globe. 
Second, these transport and communications advances, combined 
with equally revolutionary advances in electronic data processing 
devices and the accompanying managerial "software", have greatly 
enlarged the capacity of large enterprises to direct widely dispersed 
operations around the globe. 
Finally, close intellectual linkages betx/een science and 
technology, which had emerged in a few high technology areas ox 
Period II, are now encompassing a widening range of !:traditional!: 
as well as new productive activities: agriculture and food processing 
as well as petrochemicals and nuclear energy. There is now a notable 
professionalization of technological search in the various activities. 
In the private sector it lias become increasingly centered in formal 
S St D divisions of large firms. This has accelerated both the 
output of neitf and differentiated products, and also the speed with 
which economies of scale have been extended. It has further raised 
financial barriers to entry in oligopolistic markets. 
These three lines of development have led to the 
internationalization of oligopolistic competition. The 
internationalization trend was slowed for a time by the Great 
Depression and World War II, but burst out in full force in the 
decades after World War II. United States firms took a long initial 
lead over their war-damaged European and Japanese rivals, but the 
lead began to narrow in the 1960s. Future depressions may again 
slow the expansionary dynamics, but reversal does not seem likely. 
Present day policies aimed at stimulating the advance of 
creative technology in the internal economy must keep this carefully 
in mind. This is the international economic and technological 
environment in which such policies must be designed to function. 
/ 3 . A 
- 55 -
5. A critical analysis of the relative price 
distortions approach 
In this view the main source of the inappropriate technology 
problem is that Latin American countries have pursued economic and 
social development strategies which have unduly cheapened the cost 
of capital in relatioxa to labour costs. Overvalued exchange rates, 
tax and credit subsidies, and overly protective tariffs against 
competitive imports have "artificially" lowered the cost of capital 
to investors, while trade unionism and various conquistas sociales 
have raised the cost of hiring labour, at least to the larger 
enterprises. Capital-intensive activities have thus been encouraged, 
labour-using ones discouraged, and within individual activities, 
an unduly depressed ratio of capital to labour costs has encouraged 
firms to import more capital-intensive technological equipment than 
they would have had "socially correct" relative factor prices 
determined technological choice. 
To be effective, technology policies must therefore be closely 
linked to economic policies to bring relative prices in the factor 
markets closer to "true" scarcity price ratios. That is, the 
technology policies proper are similar to those advocated by the 
technological gap approach: the creation of entities for the faster 
entry ana diffusion of technological information, plus measures to 
strengthen bargaining over the "technological terms of trade". But if 
these are to facilitate the selection of more socially appropriate i 
techniques they should be complemented with trade liberalization 
measures and a reduction of foreign exchange, credit, and tax biases 
favouring investment in modern equipment rather than labour, and a 
curbing of conquistas sociales and of wage pressures from the 
unionized sectors of the labour force. The main thrust is less 
dirigiste than is the technological gap approach, the emphasis being 
less on new forms of financial subsidies linked to industry 
rationalization, and more on increasing market competition. Apart 
from correcting the price "distortions", such competition would also 
pressure enterprises toward greater efficiency; i.e., it would force 
them to be more cost-conscious, aggresive and technologically alert. 
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This view has also some valid points, notably its recognition 
that effective technology policy cannot merely focus on increasing 
information flows, but must also be linked with economic policies 
that remove decision biases which distort technological choice. 
The basic weakness of the relative price approach is that it grossly 
oversimplifies the technological choice matrix» There are two 
general aspects of this over-simplification. First, on the cost 
side, the assumption that there are readily available'alternatives 
which use more labour and become more profitable with lower relative 
wage costs is of doubtful validity. Second, dynamic demand 
considerations often make other aspects more important than relative 
capital and labour costs in the choice of techniques, 
(a) Relative capital-labour costs in the choice of technique 
The neo-classical production function, which provides, much 
of the analytic underpinnings of the relative price approach, 
implies that there is typically a wide range of techniques per 
activity, each incorporating different combinations of labour and 
physical capital, which can be purchased fully embodies in 
commercially-tested blue prints or equipment, with each alternative 
being a least-cost choice for some specified ratio of factor prices. 
This is misleading. Such a fully developed range is often quite 
small in modern activities. What is more accurate is that there 
is usually a much wider range of partially developed alternatives, 
which the growing subtlety of science and technology keeps enlarging. 
But to bring these partially developed ideas and models to economic 
fruition requires creative effort. At the least it requires testing 
various recombinations of components of already known technologies. 
Often it also requires more venturesome efforts at exploration and 
innovation to overcome obstacles hindering practical application. 
Advanced economies develop those portions of the potential range 
which hold forth profitable expectations, given their particular 
concatenations of natural resources, human skills, stock of plant and 
equipment, size of domestic markets, consumption styles, import and 
export prospects, military ambitions, etc. Since there is variance 
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as regards these conditions between the centre countries, the gamut 
of developed technologies for direct borrowing by Latin American 
countries is wider than would be the case were technological 
innovation concentrated in one country. This is, however, of only 
marginal benefit to Latin America, since the per capita income levels, 
market size and input availabilities of the centre countries as a 
group are far different from those of the technologically dependent 
peripheral countries. Correcting relative price "distortions11 will . 
affect income distribution and the level and composition of demand 
in peripheral countries. This doubtlessly will change their mix 
of imported technologies in some degree. It is unlikely, however, to 
make the revised mix "optimal" in terms of reasonable socio-economic 
welfare criteria, since such "optimal" technology is not directly 
importable for a great many activities but has to be developed by 
creative efforts guided by these welfare criteria. 
Consideration of the orientation of technological research 
in the centre countries shows more specifically the limited extent 
to which relative price changes can be expected to lead to an easy 
switch to more labour intensive techniques. The belief that such 
techniques are readily available rests in part on the implicit 
assumption that technological change in the centre countries has been 
guided to a major extent by the desire to use more capital and less 
labour because of the prevailing high relative cost of labour. The 
new techniques would then be more economical only,.or maiply, because 
of the prevailing relative prices in the centre countries; the older 
techniques would still be more profitable to use if wage costs were 
relatively low. An analysis of available data does not support this 
view. 
It is useful first to note some empirical evidence. A recent 
comprehensive analysis of capital and labour coefficients for the US 
economy between 19^7 and 1958 divided the economy into 76 
interdependant activities, using input-output analysis. In almost 
all of the activities the capital and labour cost per unit of output, 
measured in constant prices, was lower in 1958 than in 19^7, indicating 
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significant technological innovation. But extensive simulation 
experiments with a very wide range of alternative interest/wage 
ratios failed to eliminate the superiority (lower unit cost) of the 
1958 technologies in virtually all the activities. In other words, 
the innovative changes of American firms in this period were not 
introduced only because of relatively high iirage costs.8/ 
The major reason why technology does not closely follow 
changes in the interest/wage ratio in centre economies is that other 
factors frequently dominate the innovational effort. In some cases, 
particularly in natural resource processing activities, raw materials 
problems dominate the innovation search. In the US input-output 
study just referred to, for example, the few cases in which the unit 
capital plus labour costs using 1958 processes were M g h e r than for 
19^7 processes, usually involved natural resource exhaustion. In 
such cases high labour costs become a secondary consideration. 
A more general factor relates to economies of scale. There 
are a number of well-known physical and probability principles that 
cause unit costs to fall with increases in plant capacity. Indeed, 
some of these principles extend to multiple plant operations and 
to marketing, finance and administration as well as to production. 
The extent to which potential scale economies can be profitably 
exploited is limited at any point in time by three major constraints: 
i) The size of the market for the product; 
ii) Bottlenecks in the production process that limit further 
scaling up; e.g. reaching the current limits to the 
tensile strength of key structural materials, the absence 
of mechanized alternatives for the hand finishing or fitting 
phases of production, etc. 
iii) Limits to the ability to finance large-scale plants and -the 
auxiliary marketing requirements. 
Ann Carter« SV-K-MCtural Chcnge ¿ft the American Economy, 




The first and third constraints arc usually not dominant in the 
centre countries. The domestic markets of the large countries 
usually suffice to absorb the output of a number of plants or firms 
at current minimum efficient scale, while smaller countries can 
get the requisite volumes of demand through a larger admixture 
of exporting. Most centre country industries will also have one or 
more firms in each of an array of activities large enough to generate 
the requisite financing for such large-scale production and marketing. 
This means that the second constraint, technical bottlenecks, 
is the chief short-term limitation to extending economies of scale. 
It follows that innovation efforts to overcome the technical 
bottlenecks is an obvious strategy for large firms to pursue, since 
success is often crowned by a double payoff. There is the reduction 
of Unit costs, and there is also the ratcheting upward of the 
financial barriers to new competitive entry and to imitation by smaller 
firms already in the industry. The latter consideration, the 
consequence of the greater financial outlays required to build and 
operate at the higher minimum efficient scale, is of particular 
importance in oligopolistic industries, the common habitat of large 
firms in market economies. 
The importance of this aspect of innovative behaviour has been 
rising since the latter half of the 19th century, and a recent 
quantitative survey of economies of scale in various branches of 
British industry testifies to its paramount importance today. It 
reports that in around 80 per oeat of the activities surveyed, the 
minimum efficient scale of plant rose markedly since the end of 
World War II, notably in continuous process activities (chemicals, 
metal refining, cement, etc.) and in engineering activities (electronic, 
electrical and metal products).^/ 
2/ C.F.Pratten, Economies of Scale in Manufacturing Industry, 
Cambridge University Press, 1971« 
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Further analysis of this survey data shows that in virtually 
all activities with sizeable scale economies, scaling up of plant 
results in a decline of both capital and labour costs per unit of 
output. In the continuous process activities the percentage decline 
of unit labour costs usually exceeds the percentage decline of unit 
capital costs, so that the capital-labour ratio rises with scaling 
up. But the reverse tends to be the case in the engineering type 
activities, where the capital-labour ration often falls with scaling 
up.10/ The important point to note here is that if firms could 
offset both wage pressures and reduce unit capital costs by scaling 
up, then whether the capital-labour ratio rises or falls in the 
course of scaling up becomes a matter of second order importance. 
For technology-importing peripheral economies these scale 
dynamics have major analytic and policy significance. It is often 
assiuaed that large-scale plants and high capital-labour ratios go 
together, but the above data and analysis of scale dynamics 
indicate that this is often not the case and why. For example, the 
large automotive and electronic complexes in centre countries rank 
fairly low as regards capital-labour ratios- This is small comfort 
for a peripheral economy whose home market and ability to concentrate 
productive and managerial resources are inadequate for large-
scale enterprises. It can try to operate on a more modest scale. 
This will usually raise the capital-labour ratio in engineering type 
industries and lower it in continuous process industries. But in 
either case the output-labour and output-capital ratios will be 
lower than for efficient sized plants.11/ Even if management were 
equivalent in capability to that of rival centre country' complexes 
unit costs would still be higher in the small plants, except for 
those whose capital-labour ratios are so low that the lower wages 
of the peripheral economy compensate for the scale deficiency. 
10/ David Felix, "Technological dualism in late industrializes: 
On theory, history and policy", op.cit., 
11/ For Latin American evidence on this see Mario M. Cortes, 
Technological Absorption and Unemployment: A Comparative Analysis, 
Washington University, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1973» 
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More typically, the array of under-scale plants will require ample 
import protection and other subsidization as well as low wages to 
survive, the more so if managerial efficiency is also less than 
in the rival centre complexes. 
Reducing relative price "distortions" by lowering tariffs and 
subsidies will no doubt force a higher level of managerial performance. 
But this will not resolve the other aspects of inefficiency. It will 
not provide a wider range of imported technological alternatives 
for offsetting the diseconomies of small scale. Neither is the 
increased import competition likely to create a favourable market 
environment for more rapid capital accumulation and growth of firms. 
Pushed still harder and the liberalization would indeed knock out the 
inefficient firms. It is unlikely, however, that the advocates of 
such policy can provide a convincing estimate of how much of the 
industrial sector and its employment would survive the shock treatment. 
The prevalence of scale economies casts serious doubt on the 
efficacy or relative price Correction as a major strategy for 
inducing a more appropriate choice of technology. But these scale 
economies also reinforce the case for promoting indigenous 
technological creativity. For scale economies are not invariant 
to the range and designs of products produced by a given plant 
complex. Especially in engineering type processes, the size of the 
plant complex and rate of output required to minimize unit costs in 
centre countries is positively correlated with the following 
product characteristics: 
(i) The width of the range of differentiated models of the basic 
product line. 
(ii) The length of the profitable life of the model run. 
(iii) The extent to which the models incorporate complex features 
intended to augment marketability rather than basic function. 
The first two relationships to scale have to do mainly with 
market characteristics and the competitive strategies of industrial 
firms. Widening the range of differentiated models often requires 
additional production lines. New models involve outlays on designing 
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and testing and on start-up costs (retooling, etc.) for putting the 
mddel into production. Thus the shorter the life of the model run, 
the larger must be the output capacity of the plant in order to 
spread these costs* 
In centre countries, product differentiation strategies leading 
to a widening range of models and shorter-lived product runs have 
characterized 20th century industrial competition, most notably 
in consumer and capital goods. In Latin America the smaller size of 
the market for scale-intensive products has forced firms generally 
to limit the range of models and to extend the model life relative 
to firms of the centre countries. But the oligopolistic structure 
of Latin American industries and the eagerness of Latin American 
middle- and upper-income households for new consumer goods and 
foreign designs, pushes in the opposite direction, toward increasing 
the diseconomies of small scale and the import intensity of 
production of the modern industrial sector. 
The complexity of model designs, on the other hand, touches 
directly on the need for indigenous technical creativity, as well 
as on the constraints imposed by market characteristics. To illustrate, 
economies of scale for a United States model passenger car or light 
truck, 1960s vintage, was approximately as follows. In final 
assembly, unit costs for different plant capacities sloped downward 
moderately until about the 120,0OO units production per aiinum. For 
engine and drive train forging, machining and assemblying, the unit 
costs declined much more steeply up to an output of around 2^0,000 
units per annum, assuming an engine model change very 7 years. In the 
case of body stampings the downward slope was in between the two, but 
extended to an annual output of 600,000 units, assuming partial changes 
in body design each year and a complete redesign every five years. In 
1967, a given US model built by subsidiaries of a major United States 
automotive firm in Argentina and Brazil, with around 85-99 per cent . 
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direct local content and annual output runs in each country or 
around 3O9OOO units, incurred the following percentage increases 
per unit over costs for equivalent production phases in the United 
States.12/ 
Final assembly 15 - kO per cent 
Engine and drive train components 
and assembly 30 300 per cent 
Body stampings 80 - 100 per cent 
Amortization and other capital charges 200 - 330 per cent 
Total cost difference 71 - 15k per cent 
Lengthening the model life would clearly reduce the cost 
disadvantage of small scale, mainly by reducing item k). But 
simplifying the design would reduce the cost disadvantages further. 
The intricate contour lines of the United States models require 
complicated tool and die work, very heavy presses and high tensile, 
uniform quality cold rolled sheet steel, all related to styling 
rather than function. Economies from design simplification in this 
phase are enormous, and would also permit a substantial scaling-dovm 
of plant and equipment. Tooling costs for small presses to bend 
sheet metal into lesser contortions run from 5 to 10 per cent of 
the costs of the heavy die presses needed in the above example to 
contour sheet metal,13/ with additional savings from less machining 
and from the use of lower quality sheet metal. Equipment economizing 
could also be obtained from not contouring windshield and rear glass 
panels. Substantial additional economizing on forging and machining 
facilities is obtainable if engines were reduced in horse-power and 
power-driven accesories cut back, the consumer utility loss this time 
being in convenience but not in basic function. Saving of fuel from 
lighter engines, lesser foreign exchange outlays from using lower-grade 
12/ Jack Baranson, Automotive Industries in Developing Countries» 
IBRD, World Bank staff occasional papers, Ii2~"B, Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1969, Table 
1,3/ Jack Baranson, op.cit., p„ 7 1 . 
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sheet metal and fewer special steels, and economizing of road 
construction costs by building vehicles with tighter suspensions 
and higher road clearance, indicate that the resource economizing 
would spill over to many other areas. 
This is a fairly obvious illustration. The introduction of 
simplified models like the Citroneta and VW Beatle indicates 
that some international automotive companies are fairly quick to supply 
such models for middle-income segments of the Latin American middle 
classes. Nor is the illustration meant to imply that automotive 
redesigning is necessarily the place to begin developing indigenous 
technology for overcoming the economy of scale hurdle. However, 
the wide range of automotive models of varying complexity and luxury 
produced or imported in Latin America makes the illustration 
particularly apt for introducing the final major flaw in the relative 
price approach - its grossly inadequate theory of consumer demand. 
(b) The importance of consumer demand and the demonstration effect 
in the choice of technique 
The theory of consumer demand that underlies the relative price 
approach is notoriously too static to provide adequate analytic support . 
for the relative price approach. Formally, the theory analyzes the 
hypothetical behaviour of the "rational" consumer, that is, one with a 
stable and internally consistent preference ranking for the items of 
a pre-determined and unchanging range of goods and services. The 
objective of the consumer, who is assumed to know accurately the 
properties of the various goods in the range, is to maximize his 
satisfaction from consumption, subject to the limitation that his 
income usually is too small to allow him to consume all he would really 
like. Should the relative prices of the goods change, the consumer 
vill adjust his purchases, generally substituting more of the goods 
whose relative prices have fallen for those whose prices have risen, 
the elasticity of his response to price changes varying for the 
different goods in accordance with the differing intensities of 
his preference for them. Similarly, if his income rises, he will 
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increase his purchases of most goods in his consumption basket, 
but in different proportions, so that his income elasticity of 
demand will also vary as between different goods. 
In a community, the decision by some consumers to alter their 
purchases of some goods, will usually alter the relative prices of 
goods and hence the consumption decisions and satisfactions of 
other members of the community. But except for this third party 
impact on relative prices through market demand, the welfare obtained 
from consumption by each individual or household is assumed to be 
unaffected by what or how much others consume. There are assumed 
to be no positive or negative "neighbourhood" or non-market price 
impact (pollution, emulation or band-wagon effects, etc.) through 
which one consumer by his pattern of consumption can damage or 
benefit another. With these assumptions it follows that an 
economy with free functioning competitive markets will maximize consumer 
welfare in the short term; that is, with the overall productive 
capacity of that economy taken as given. 
Among economic theorists there is mounting criticism of the 
limited explanatory power of this highly restrictive static schema. 
For our purposes, technology policy, the chief defect of the theory 
is its inability to explain consumer behaviour toward one of the 
major phenomena of modern times: the increasingly rapid rate of entry 
of new goods and new variants of exisitng goods in the consumer 
market. This basic defect, in turn, undermines other of the premises 
and welfare conclusions of the theory. 
According to annual surveys by McGraw-Hill, US firms in the 
early 1960s devoted 48 per cent of their R & D expenditures to 
creating new products, another per cent to improving existing 
product lines, and only 11 per cent to improving production 
processes, iff/ Many of the new and improved products were capital goods 
Ik/ Cited in W. Eric Gustafson, "Research and development, new 
products, and productivity change" Amer ican Economic_ Review, 
Vol. LII (May, 1962). 
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or intermediate materials, and thus represented, indirectly, process 
improvements for the user firm. But a large proportion were consumer 
goods. Once again, the data go contrary to the factor biased technical 
change hypothesis. U.S. firms were not even devoting a very large 
part of their R & D to improving their own processes, whether / 
to adjust it to changes in the interest/wage ratio or whatever? 
they were devoting most of it to product differentiation to either 
capturing temporary monopoly positions by reaching the market with new 
products and product variants ahead of their competitors, or 
undercutting their competitors' temporary monopolies by developing 
salable imitations. 
This sort of behaviour is known to be peculiarly characteristic 
of oligopolistic industries, in which firms rarely engage in open 
price competition, but compete through product differentiation in its 
various dimensions. Much of private R & D outlays in the US and other 
centre economies represent, then an extension of product differentiation 
competition, motivated by the same market control objectives as are 
expenditures on advertising, packaging, consumer finance and other 
marketing devices. 
To assess market prospect for nextf consumer products, to 
advise firms on how to increase the effectiveness of their 
advertising, and on how to entice consumers to new goods through 
packaging, brand name selecting and market segmenting, a whole 
new body of applied marketing theory has emerged in recent years, 
primarily as a branch of social psychology rather than economics. 
In this theorizing, the consumer is an individual with far more plastic 
preferences than is the self-reliant rational consumer of economic 
consumer demand theory. His ability to compare qualities and prices 
of different goods is quite limited, as are also his time and means 
for enlarging his limited knowledge. To fill the gap he relies 
heavily on emulation of peer groups and on familiar trademarks. He 
responds to status and sexual symbols in advertising and product 
styling, and, his buying habits are subject to impulses and caprices. 
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He is still held in by a purchasing power constraint, his income 
and borrowing capacity, hence relative prices are not unimportant 
for him. Some of his preferences are indeed deep rooted; notably in 
the area of food. But within his overall income constraint, much 
of his changing consumption patterns cannot be explained by the 
static theory of consumer demand. In empirical demand studies by 
economists this shows up in the frequent statistical insignificance 
or "wrong11 sign of the price variable in the econometric demand 
equations. 
It is a short step analytically from dynamic analysis of 
consumer behaviour of the socio-psychological sort, to the famous 
"international demonstration effect" common to discussions of the 
changing consumption patterns of the modern sectors in Latin America. 
From casual observation it is apparent that these patterns have 
been following the changing patterns of the centre countries, and 
that the time lag in the imitation process has been shortening over 
the postwar period. What still needs to be sorted out more precisely 
is how much of the rate of inflow of new and differentiated goods and 
consumption styles reflects an income effect and how much reflects 
shifts in preferences that are largely independent of income changes. 
That the income constraint is important is indicated by the 
heavy emphasis in the marketing strategies of most large consumer-
goods producers in Latin America on "skimming the cream" from the 
market; i.e., directing their product lines and promotional strategies 
at the wealthiest 20 to 30 per cent or so of consumers. 
Except for Argentina and Uruguay, the penetration of very few 
modern sector goods, apart from some processed foods and textiles, 
filters down much below this strata of households, other than via 
the sale of second-hand goods and cast-offs.15/ 
15/ The percentage of metropolitan families in the market is often 
higher,, but as is shown in a recent ECLA study, the average 
household income of all urban income groupings in the major Latin 
American cities, from the lowest 20 per cent of families on up, 
is also significantly higher in absolute terms than equivalent 
strata in provincial cities and towns and the countryside. 
"Income distribution in selected major cities of Latin America 
and in their respective countries-'' Economic Bulletin for Latin 
America, Vol. XVIII, 1973, pp. 13-01 . . /The changing 
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The changing composition of consumption of the higher income 
strata is, however, also in the domain of the international 
demonstration effect. Unfortunately, this domain has not been 
explored in much detail thus far. Household expenditure surveys 
as conventionally structured go only a small way toward elucidating 
the effect. This is partly because their samples are cross-sectional 
rather than across time, but also because they tend to aggregate 
goods into broad types, thus blurring analysis of even the cross-
sectional change of the product mixes within each category. Some 
enlightenment is provided by such surveys, such as that motorcar 
oxring families in Latin America tend to spend a higher percentage of 
their income on the purchase, care and feeding of their vehicles than 
in most centre countries. But much more detailed evidence remains 
to be gathered and analysed in order to capture the dynamics of the 
demonstration effect. 
Moreover, the income constraint ought not to be taken as 
pre-determined and independent of the demonstration effect. A loosely 
stated hypothesis in the economic development literature asserts 
that the appearance of modern goods has an incentive effect, 
stimulating individual efforts to save and earn more income for 
the purpose of acquiring the goods. Increased individual productive 
effort is, however, only one way to increase one's income. Often it 
may not even be the most effective way, if the institutional 
environment is adverse. One's income and access to credit can also 
be increased by exercising market or political power, or by cutting 
the corners of legality. Since the ability to effectively exercise 
such power is very unequally distributed, a high rate of inflow of new 
"incentive goods!; via an intensification of the demonstration effect 
can well lead to a further concentration of income. That is, 
individuals and groups may wield their market power, their influence 
on government expenditure, and their tax-evading skills more intensely 
in order to generate the additional income needed to satisfy their 
new consumption aspirations. 
/This corollary 
This corollary of the "incentive goods" hypothesis has a 
degree of prima facie plausibility in Latin America, and may well 
contribute to the special intensity and persistence of inflation in 
the region.jé/ It also implies that contrary to the usual 
specifications of statistical demand equations, income may be in part 
the dependent variable and consumer demand partly the independent 
variable. This likely interdependence of the key variables makes it 
even more difficult to assess quantitatively the extent of the 
demonstration effect. However, the following partial pieces of 
evidence on household savings behaviour, offer some quantitative 
clues which suggests both the importance of the effect and areas for 
further research on its impact. 
1962 household incone-expenditure survey data for Venezuela show 
that in the major cities only families earning 2,000 bolívares per month 
and up had positive savings. In small towns, however, positive savings 
began with family incomes of 500 bolívares and in rural areas with 
family incomes of 400 bolívares. Only 22 per cent of rural and small 
town families spent more than their income, whereas in Caracas the 
proportion was 80 per cent and in other major Venezuelan cities it 
was 67 per cent. Sural and small town families as a whole save 
10 per cent of their income while in Caracas aggregate household savings 
rate was -16.5 per cent, and in other major cities, -10 per cent. 
Brazilian data for 1961-1962 show a similar pattern. Sao Paulo 
families began to save at a family income level three times higher 
than the income at which families in Belem began to save. As a result, 
only 3 per cent of all Sao Paulo families were net savers, whereas 
nearly 70 per cent of Belem families saved part of their income«17/ 
16/ Hark os hamalakis, The Theory^ of Sectoral Clajshejs, Development 
Centre Reprint NQ <T,™'University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, 1970. 
17/ ECLA, "Income distribution in selected major cities of Latin 
America and in their respective countries", op.cit. p.43. 
Expenditure includes the acquisition of motor cars. 
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The implications for societal welfare of an intensified 
demonstration effect are, therefore, more problematic than is implied . 
by the economic theory of consumer demand« In fact, the impacts of 
the changing consumer styles are generating concerns at both ends 
of the demonstration effect channel, although the issues involved 
differ in the very afluent centre countries from those of the 
periphery» 
The problems of very affluent societies like the United States 
and Sv/eden are more psychic in nature, related to a questioning 
whether much additional utility obtains any longer for the affluent, 
i.e. families of the upper 20-j50 per cent income strata of such 
countries, from adding to their Consumer stocks, beyond the passing 
pleasures of acquisition. 
Initially consumer durables and various "convenience goods" were 
time-saving for the household, and this, plus shorter working hours, 
gave the household more leisure time. But with continued accumulation 
of consumer capital the time saving gets offset by the increasing 
amounts of leisure time absorbed in stock keeping maintenance, and in 
troubling decisions about when and how to use the gro\;ing stocks. 
Individual items in the stocks, moreover, depreciate rapidly as status 
symbols, since their acquisition usually spreads over the community, 
while the insistent messages from the market place to purchase new 
status items mount exponentially. The harried leisure classes faced 
\\fith an increasing sense of inadequate leisure time, feel compelled 
to dispense with older time-consuming modes of enjoying leisure. 
Life styles change-at a more rapid pace, and the pursuit of leisure 
consumption becomes more frenetic and unsatisfying. The ecological 
movement, dropping out of the "rat race;! by the middle-aged, the 
"counter-culture" of the young, are inchoate manifestations of a 
growing malaise among the international consumption style setters, 
the affluent sectors of the centre countries. This could purport some 
major qualitative changes in the future content of international 
demonstration effect on the imitative Latin American consumers, perhaps 
even a slowing of the pace. 
/At the 
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At the receiving end, the periphery countries, the current 
problems with the demonstration effect are of a quite different 
order. In the first place, there is much less reason for the 
higher income strata to become ridden with self-doubt about the utility 
to then of their acquired modern life style. Household durables, 
the private motor car, and other modern conveniences are still 
time-liberating for the Latin American buyer. And as long as an 
income gulf limits such goods to a minority of the households, the 
status value of modern acquisitions also depreciate more slowly 
than in the centre countries. It would, therefore, be unrealistic 
to expect anti-materialistic emanations from abroad to generate the 
same eager response from the upper income Latin American strata as 
have the materialistic emanations. In general, the avidity for 
modern goods in Latin America remains broadly rational from the 
private point of view. One cannot, therefore, place much 
reliance, on the possibility that future changes in the international 
demonstration effect will, like a hidden hand, spontaneously 
bring about a more socially optimal pattern of consumer 
preferences in the region. 
With no significant changes in the existing market structure 
and industrial policies prevalent in Latin America, the changing demand 
patterns of the middle and upper income groups will continue to 
dominate thé changing pattern of production of the modern sector, apart 
from exports. The large domestically-owned firms id.ll continue 
finding it more profitable and less risky to replenish temporary 
monopoly positions in their oligopolistic markets by importing their 
new product designs and processes, since these come complete with 
technical assistance and even prestigious trademarks and marketing help. 
They will resist» again for quite rational reasons from the private 
point of view, attempts to force them to' do their own R & D . Investing 
in 2 Si D would be a large added business expense, with much lower 
probability of profitable returns fron the outlay than if the same 
suras were used for new foreign licensing agreements. 
/Multinational 
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Multinational subsidiaries will resist for a somewhat different 
set of reasons. Uithin the multinational organization, the capability 
of doing effective R & D is obviously very high, but it is centered 
in the headquarters country. In the late 1960s, United States 
multinationals spent 97.b per cent of their R & D in the United States; 
the 2.6 per cent performed abroad being done almost entirely by 
transport equipment firms and chiefly in l/estern Europe and Canada. 13/ 
Production subsidiaries in peripheral economies, are, to the 
multinational company, mainly marketing by other means. The 
subsidiaries are typically set up at first in order to hurdle 
obstacles against gaining or keeping access to the local market 
via direct exporting of products. They continue to serve mainly 
as a funnel for extending the profitable life of successive products 
developed at headquarters for the centre country market by producing 
them later in the peripheral countries. Were the peripheral market 
to grow to some critical size, at that point there is little doubt 
that multinationals would begin to find it more profitable to forego 
some of the quasi-rents on their centre type products, and to modify 
them for peripheral market characteristics. United States 
multinationals already do some of this for their European markets, 
although this lias not yet happened on any significant scale, as 
regards the peripheral country markets. But even if such efforts 
were to become an important part of a revised strategy of 
multinationals, there is little reason to doubt that the R & D 
would still be conducted in headquarters country facilities where 
talent and experience is already well-developed, and the top corporate 
managers on hand to regulate the effort. 
Data from McGraw Hill "Survey of business plans for research 
and development expenditures, 1967-1970" (May 1967), as summarized 
in Constantine V. Vaitsos, "Income distribution, welfare 
considerations and transnational enterprises" (presented at 
the Bellagio Conference on the Multinational Enterprise and 
Economic Analysis, September 1972). 
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The demonstration effect seems thus to be an integral part 
of a complex systems-maintenance mechanism that keeps dependent 
peripheral economies from breaking out of Phase I technological 
dependency. The same mechanism also sharply restrains the rate 
of trickling down of modern consumption goods to the lower 70 per cent 
of the population. The mechanism of systems maintenance functions 
in the following four ways: 
Ci) Technological choice in the modern sector is governed by 
the processing requirements of the succession of new goods, and the 
processes, in turn, incorporate the labour saving and scale economy 
trends of process technology in the centre countries. Hence it 
sharply limits the growth of labour absorptive capacity of the modern 
sector in the peripheral countries. 
(ii) The private utility of key modern goods, e.g., the motor car 
or the TV receiver, are heavily dependent on sizeable complementary 
public expenditures on expressways, tunnels, underground parking, 
telecommunications, etc. Given the political power of the higher 
income strata, a major share of public works expenditures tend to 
be devoted t;o maintaining the private utility of such consumer 
durables. The widespread incidence of abysmal housing, inadequate 
rural clinics, schools and water works in the majority of Latin 
American countries does not mobilize public resources with nearly 
the alacrity and dedication as does traffic congestion. 
(iii) The negative impact of the demonstration effect on household 
savings ratios indicated earlier, and its probable stimulus to 
tax evasion, limits at the macro-level the rate of domestically 
financed capital formation to GNP. Hence it helps sustain one of 
the critical obstacles to maintaining rates of economic growth high 
enough to compensate for the limited employment effect of the modern 
sector. 
(iv) The rapid rate of introduction of new and differentiated 
products augments the demand for industrial imports to equip and 
supply the new lines of production. New products tend to form 
successive links of a domestic product substitution chain; e.g. the 
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succession from cotton and wool textiles, to rayon, to various 
synthetics, to new weaves and finishes; or from radio to radio-
phonograph combinations, to black-white TV receivers, to coloured TV, 
to tape recorders, with accompanying shifts from vacuum tubes through 
various generations of solid state substitutes and other component 
improvements. New products tend initially to have fewer domestic 
backward linkages and hence a much higher import content per unit 
of output than the older product which they partially displace in 
the domestic market. New products based on foreign designs and 
processes, usually raise the import intensity of the overall product 
category. As home demand for the new products spread, opportunities 
for local substitution of the imported components tend to be 
exploited and the import content falls. The fall however, will then 
be offset by the introduction of still newer versions of the general 
product category with their initially high import content. Thus, 
whether the import coefficient of the product category rises or falls 
secularly depends critically on whether the pace of new product 
introduction outruns or falls short of the pace of import substitution 
of backward linkages. 
The new products, moreover, tend to be more technologically 
complex and to be based much more on new materials developed abroad 
than are the-older generation products. Hence efforts to keep pace 
with new backward linkages run into increasing obstacles, notably 
scale and skill deficiencies. The import content curve then begins 
to rise for the product category. The same dynamic substitutions 
obtain also between product categories, so that the import/output 
ratio of the entire modern sector also begins to rise. In all 
industrializing Latin American countries the import/full capacity 
output ratio began to turn up in the 1950s. The actual ratio rose 
at a slower rate primarily because balance-of-payments difficulties 
frequently forced governments into restrictive fiscal-monetary efforts, 
during which domestic demand fell and excess capacity rose. Thus, 
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an intensifying demonstration effect underlies perhaps the major 
obstacle to sustaining high economic growth rates in the modern sector: 
the tendency for import requirements to grow faster than the capacity 
to import during periods of rapid growth.19/ 
(c) An appraisal of the relative price distortion approach 
The main virtue of the approach is that it does emphasize what 
the technological gap approach largely disregards; that the 
inappropriate choice of technology in Latin American countries reflects 
market forces that bias entrepreneurial decisions in a socially 
suboptimal direction, rather than merely an inadequate inflow and 
dissemination of technological information from abroad» The critical 
deficiency of the relative price distortion approach is its underlying 
theoretical model. The model is based on institutional and behavioural 
assumptions that abstract from such central real world phenomena as 
uneven capacities to generate technology between countries, increasing 
economies of scale, uncertainty and uneven financial constraints on 
accumulation between small and large firms, oligopolistic competition, 
and plastic consumer preferences. It is nevertheless the basic model 
which guides the prescriptions for optimizing technological borrowing 
by eliminating relative price distortions, even though the model 
provides no analysis of either the complex of forces, other than 
relatative prices, that govern technological progress in the centre 
countries, nor of the socio~psychological forces, other than relative 
prices and incomes, that influence consumer choice in the countries 
of the periphery. 
Considerable emphasis has been given here to analyzing the 
relative factor price distortion approach for two special reasons. 
The first is that corrective proposals for the technology problems 
of Latin American countries originating abroad have centred heavily 
19/ For supporting quantitative evidence from post-war Argentina, 
see David Felix, "The dilemma of import substitution", in 
G.F. Popanek, ed., Development Policy: Theory and Practice, 
Harvard University Press, 1968. 
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on relative price corrections; for example, the summary volume of 
the recent set of studies of industrialization in various peripheral 
countries by the 0ECD.2Q/ 
The second is that in Latin America, even many critics of the 
market liberalization solutions, when they resort on occasion to 
economic analysis to buttress their case, tend to fall back on 
arguments implicitly drawn from the same normative model as are the 
views they are criticizing« We have in mind in particular, the static 
treatment of monopoly as a major distorting force, leading to overly 
simplified policy proposals for eliminating monopoly distortions, 
including even quick price "fixes" to reduce monopoly rents. Monopoly 
power is indeed endemic in Latin American economies. Its roots are, 
however, not merely in highly concentrated ownership of physical and 
financial assets, but also in various dynamic factors related to market 
demand, technological change and capital accumulation. A deeper 
understanding of these dynamic factors is a sine qua non if the 
technological and accumulation capacities of Latin American countries 
are to be guided toward a more equitable social and economic 
development than has been the experience to date. The critical 
commentary on the relative price distortion approach is intended to 
provide preliminary guidelines for the detailed micro-analysis of 
these dynamic factors that still remains largely to be done. 
But it is clear that measures to change prevailing relative 
prices - to reduce labour costs in relation to the cost of capital 
and equipment - combined with competitive pressures to force firms 
to be more efficient, are alone unlikely to result in widespread 
adoption of more appropriate forms of technology. Alternative techniques 
which use more labour, and which would become more profitable if labour 
costs were reduced in relative terms, are often not readily available. 
20/ I.M.D. Little, M. Scott and T. Seitovs&y, Industry and Trade 
in Developing Countries: A Comparative Study (London, 1970)» 
/ F u r t h e r , t h e 
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Further, the dynamics of consumer demand are often of greater 
importance to the firm when choosing products and techniques than 
are relative factor prices« Changes in relative prices may be 
required but they will need to be supplemented by other, and 
probably more basic, measures if a sustained shift toward the 
development and use of a more appropriate technology is to be 
succesfully promoted» 
/ C h a p t e r I I 
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Chapter II 
SOME NUMERICAL EXERCISES: ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE TO 
BE CONSIDERED IN THE ORIENTATION 
OF TECHNOLOGY POLICY 
The historical analysis in the preceding chapter shows that 
in those countries which have been successful in the effort at late 
industrialization, technological creativity has emerged at a 
relatively early stage. The types of technology in use in'the most 
advanced countries have changed rapidly with the passing of time, 
and the more general external economic and political environment 
has also been different in different periods. In these changing 
circumstances one of the key factors to success has been the 
ability to adapt to the conditions of the time, and to evolve new 
policies conducive to the early establishment of suitable forms 
of technological creativity. This leads to the conclusion that 
successful industrialization in Latin America will also require 
an adaptation of policies and institutions, designed to stimulate 
the development of the forms of technological creativity judged 
most appropriate in the environment of today. 
The critical analysis of important currents of thought 
regarding technological problems - what have been referred to 
as the technological gap and the relative price distortion 
approaches - reinforces this view. In the present-day world 
economy it is not likely to be sufficient to encourage the use 
of advanced techniques from the centre countries, with the 
expectation that with time and some assistance this will lead 
to internal technological creativity. The new techniques are 
likely to continue to be brought in from abroad and to be of a 
sort not well suited to the conditions of the region. Stronger 
and more immediate measures will be required to produce technological 
creativity of the sort required. 
/1. Present-day 
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1. Present-day conditions and the dilemma to be faced 
A major question in all this is "What sort of technology is 
required in the conditions of today?" Perhaps the principal 
"condition" to be noted is that, as has become increasingly clear, 
the patterns of development generally followed in Latin America 
(and the technology which has been used) have spread their benefits 
very unevenly} there has been no obvious or rapid integration of 
the entire economy. This situation, and the problems it poses, 
has been discussed in the Introduction to this documentj and 
various aspects have been analyzed in detail in Chapter I. It is 
one of the central problems which an adequate sort of creative 
technology will have to confront. 
The present chapter illustrates this problem through the use 
of a Relatively simple numerical exercise. This helps to make more 
explicit the dilemma involved and to assign approximate orders of 
magnitude. Also, a simulation experiment projects these magnitudes 
to the end of the century to give an idea of what trends might be 
expected with different assumptions. It is well to emphasize at 
once that these projections are not predictions! they only show 
what would happen given the assumptions used in the exercise. 
It is useful first to look at the problem in the most general 
terms, to regard "technology" in the widest sense as the total of 
all those aspects of economic organization which determine the 
volume of goods and services available to a community. This total 
can be conveniently estimated by the use of the gross product 
figures, which can then, give an approximate idea of the present 
overall level of technology in Latin America and how it might evolve. 
Corresponding figures for the centre countries are given to provide 
a standard for comparison. In 1970 the per capita gross product of 
Latin America as a whole was USf 5kO, while for the developed 
market economies as a whole the figure was US$ 2,960. The figures 
for major Western European countries such as France or West Germany 
are very similar to this latter average, although there are of 
course, centre countries both at somewhat higher and at somewhat lower 
/levels.1/ The 
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levels.l/ The average figure can therefore be taken as representing 
a high level of technology, but one in general use in a number of 
countries» In these most general terms then, the average level of 
technology in Latin America in 1970 was rather less than one-fifth 
that of the advanced centre countries. 
This makes clear the magnitude of the inequality which must 
result if technology is used to try to more or less reproduce the 
production pattern of the centre countries - a production which is 
geared to income levels far above the Latin American average. The 
extent to which this sort of inequality has been introduced into 
the production structure of the region has already been discussed, 
both in the Introduction and in Chapter I. It makes clear that an 
appropriate technological policy should be at least as concerned 
with the type of product to be made, and the general development 
pat corn to be followed, as with selecting the most appropriate way 
to produce a specific item. 
This is the existing situation. It needs also to be asked 
how fast this "gap" might reasonably be expected to close. Since 
technological policy will inevitably bear full fruit only over a 
considerable period of time, what sort of future pattern would it 
be appropriate'to aim at? The general order of magnitude involved, 
and how much the "gap" can be narrowed with different assumptions 
can be readily determined by the use of a series of relatively 
simple simulation experiments. 
The central difficulty can be shown at once by presenting a 
calculation based on rather favourable assumption about future 
economic advance in the region. The main assumptions and results 
of this calculation are as follows: 
1/ The figures are taken from the United Nations, Yearbook of 
National Accounts Statistics 1971, Vol. Ill, Table 1A. They 
are in current 1970 dollars and conversions have been made 





If Latin America is able to sustain a rapid increase in per 
capita production levels, the total income per capita at the end of 
the century will be nearly 70 per cent of the present day average 
in the centre countries. But even assuming per capita income 
increase much more rapidly in Latin America than in the centre 
countries throughout this thirty year period, the average in these 
countries would still be triple the Latin American figure at the 
end of the century. For Latin America to reach full parity in this 
sense income per capita would have to increase at an average annual 
rate of 8.5 per cent during these thirty years, which in turn would 
require an annual increase in the gross product of slightly more 
than 11 per cent. 
These results do not follow from the use of pessimistic 
assumptions in the calculations. For the developed countries it 
has been assumed that population will increase at an average annual 
rate of 0.5 per cent to the end of the century. In most of the 
Western European centre countries population growth has already 
slowed to this figure, and if anything the rate of population 
increase in the next several decades will probably be less than that 
shown. With the population increase assumed, the gross product will 
have to increase at a rate of only 3.0 per cent per annum to achieve 
the specified increase in per capita incomes. In the recent past 
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rates, and projections into the future generally also foresee rather 
higher rates of growth» The rate of growth in per capita incomes 
shown for the centre countries is therefore a conservative figure; 
it does not require even the continuation of recent past performance. 
The assumptions used for Latin America are by contrast more 
likely to prove optimistic. The projected annual rate of growth of 
the population (2.4 per cent) is well below the present rate for 
the region (2.9 per cent), and also below most expectations about 
the average rate likely to prevail over the 1970-2000 period. 
Given the youthful age structure of the population, a sharp decline 
in age specific birth rates would be required for the annual 
increase to average no more than 2.4 per cent over the period. 
Even so, the projected increase in per capita incomes requires an 
average annual increase in the gross product of 7 per cent - compared 
to only 3 per cent in the centre countries. 
This is well above what the region has been able to achieve 
in past periods - during the 1960's, for example, the gross product 
increased at an average annual rate of 5.4 per cent. Still, in 
recent years very high growth rates have begun to seem increasingly 
possible, and a 7 per cent figure may not appear startlingly high. 
It needs to be emphasized however, that a 7 per cent average annual 
increase in the gross product over a 30 year period would be a 
startling achievement. By the end of the century total production 
would be 7 1/2 times that of 1970, so that the economy known today 
would be only a minor element in thai; to be built. In little, more 
than a single generation an entirely new and vastly larger economic 
structure would have to be created - taking Latin America as a 
whole this new structure would be nearly half again as large as 
the 1970 economies of all of the countries of Western Europe combined. 
The 
economic achievement of Western Europe since the end of the 
Second World War, itself nearly a 30 year period, is generally 
regarded as very impressive. If the economies of Latin America were 
to expand at a 7 per cent rate to the end of the century the 
achievement would be very much more substantiall starting from a 
/smaller base 
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smaller base, the absolute increase in the volume of production 
would be much greater. Somewhat more will be said about specific 
difficulties encountered in achieving very high growth rates later 
in this chapter. 
There is a clear conclusion to be drawn from this exercises 
it is not possible to "catch up" with the advanced industrial 
countries in the foreseeable future, and for the region as a whole 
any policy aimed at that goal is illusory. This means that a 
technological policy aimed at keeping pace with the latest product 
designs and innovations in the centre countries is also an illusion. 
These products and processes will be developed for populations with 
much higher average income levels than those which will prevail in 
the region. If they are introduced it can only be for a minority 
of the population, and the disparities in income which now exist 
will be continued. 
A more realistic policy goal might be to aim at achieving the 
current high Western European levels of technology and living 
standards by around the end of the century, which would in itself 
be an enormous achievement and advance. This would mean that the 
production pattern and techniques already known would be the 
approximate objective. New product designs and innovations would , 
be regarded critically and only introduced if they were clearly 
suitable to the needs of the region or offered some special advantage. 
Creative internal technology would mostly be concerned with better 
adaptation of existing techniques, and with spreading the use of 
these techniques more widely through the economy. 
While these are the realistic prospects for Latin America viewed 
as a whole, it needs to be noted that there is considerable diversity 
within the region and so scope for variation among national goals. 
An idea of the potential range can be given by making the same 
projection for a high income country, such as Argentina, and for 
one of the several smaller countries of the region where the per 
capita gross product in 1970 was only around US$ 300. The figures 
are as follows: 
/Gross product 
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Developed country 2 960 2.5 6 210 
Argentina 1 050 4.5 3 930 
Low income country 300 4.5 1 125 
If a higher income country such as Argentina can increase per 
capita incomes at the rate of 4.5 per cent per annum they can be 
raised to well above the current Western European level by the end 
of the century, and to nearly two-thirds the level these countries 
are themselves projected to have at that time. Further, in the 
specific case of Argentina, the rate of population increase is well 
below that in most countries so that a total growth rate of 5«5 per 
cent to 6.0 per cent would probably suffice for this purpose 
(compared to 7.0 per cent required for the region as a whole). If 
a really rapid rate of growth could be sustained, "catching up" with 
the centre countries would be a more feasible goal for a high income 
country such as Argentina, In this case technological policy could 
appropriately be more heavily oriented toward keeping abreast of 
the latest developments in the centre countries, as there would be 
a greater expectation that these developments could be suitably 
adapted for use by the bulk of the population. 
For the poorer countries of the region however, even achieving 
the present level of the advanced countries does not appear to be a 
realistic goal within these time limits. Rates of population 
increase are typically high in these countries so that the projected 
per capita figure could well require a total growth rate somewhat 
higher even than the 7 per cent cited earlier. Achieving, by the 
end of the century, a oer caouta gross product 40-50 per cent of 
/the present 
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the present West European level might be a more appropriate goal for 
these countries.» This would require even greater care in designing 
an appropriate technological policy. 
This general point of what is feasible during the next several 
decades is most clearly seen when discussed in terms of the entire 
population to be provided for. Also, per capita output figures are 
important to keep in mind when considering the type of goods 
produced; and it is worth stressing again that the selection of the 
goods to be produced should itself be considered an important aspect 
of technological choice. But other aspects of the level of 
technology are better related to employment rather than to the . 
population as a iirhole, and so it is convenient at this point to shift 
the basis of the discussion to the labour force. 
The general future prospect can also be expressed in these 
terms. Calculations similar to those above, but in terms of 
production per member of the labour force are as follows (figures 
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The general conclusions are the same, although there is some 
difference in the relative magnitude of the figures.^/ 
Thus far the discussion has been in terms of average 
productivity, but one of the key characteristics of the Latin American 
economy is the existence of an important, high productivity, modern 
sector, while the bulk of the labour force is still engaged in 
activities where productivity levéis are moderate to low. Although 
in average terms the level of technology and the standard of living 
are well below those of Western Europe (and are likely to remain 
so), it is still possible to pursue a policy of trying to "catch 
up", and this is in effect the policy which has generally been 
followed« Modern type products and production methods aré taken 
over more or less intact from the advanced countries} these are 
generally designed for use by populations with high income levels, 
and advanced techniques are available for their production} those 
who produce and consume these goods (and their associated services) 
become something of a closed and limited group in the economy. The 
major implications of this process, particularly with respect to the 
distribution of income, have already been discussed in the Introduction; 
2/ When expressed in these terms the gap between Latin America 
and the developed countries is less in 1970, since in Latin 
America the labour force is only about 31 per cent of the 
population while in countries such as France or West Germany 
the figure is around kZ per cent. This largely reflects the 
differences in age structure resulting from the higher birth 
rate: an average worker in Latin America has a relatively high 
productivity, but also has more dependents to support. At the 
same time, the labour force is likely to increase at an 
average rate of around 3 per cent annum for the rest of this 
century; a decline in the rate of population increase will 
only begin to affect thè labour force figures after about a 
15 year lag, and a declining birth rate would probably léad 
to higher participation rates for women. Thus a 7 per cent 
aggregate growth rate would mean an increase in productivity 
per member of the labour force of only 4 per cent. Again for 
Argentina the situation is different from most of the region: 
the participation rate is already higher (36.5 per cent) and 
the labour force will probably increase at less than 1.5 per 
cent per annum so that a lower growth rate is implied by the 
4 per cent rate of productivity increase. 
/and some 
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and some important elements of the process itself, relating more 
specifically to the choice of technology, have been analyzed in 
Chapter 1» All that needs to the emphasized here are the likely 
consequences of continuing a policy of this sort. 
Although fully adequate data ott productivity levels for 
different groups are not available, the situation can be illustrated 
in approximate terms. For this purpose the economy can be divided 
into three large groups as follows: 
(a) A modern sector which we will assume employs about 20 per 
cent of the labour force with productivity levels about 
three-quarters the economy-wide average in countries 
such as France or West Germany. With these assumptions 
the modern sector accounts for about 60 per cent of total 
production. 
(b) An intermediate sector which occupies about half the 
labour force and where productivity levels are rather 
less than one-quarter those of the modern sector. This 
sector accounts for somewhat more than one-third of 
total production. 
(c) A "subsistence" sector where 30 per cent of the labour 
force is engaged in activities with very low productivity 
levels and which therefore accounts for a minimal part of 
total production (around 5 per cent). 
This term is used to describe that substantial part of the 
population engaged in occupations in which productivity and 
incomes are very low. It does not imply that such occupations 
are outside the market economy; on the contrary, the marginal 
type urban services which occupy a major proportion of this 
group are an integral part of the urban money economy. In so 
far as it is interpreted literally it should instead be taken 
to mean that incomes of this group are not much more than what 
is needed to subsist. The term is not completely satisfactory 
but on the whole seems preferible to others (the "primitive" 
sector, for example) which have been used. 
/This is 
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This is the existing reality: a top group with productivity and 
income levels not too far below those of many of the advanced 
industrial countries, and whose members can therefore reasonably 
aim at the kind of consumption patter prevailing in those countries? 
while the bulk of the population is much poorer and for the most 
part can only watch the process from outside.4/ 
The possibilities for the orientation of future growth revolve, 
in this sense, around the extent to which investment and technological 
advance are (i) to continue to be concentrated on the introduction 
of ever new goods and processes in the modern sector, allowing this 
sector to advance in line with developments in the centre countries; 
or (ii) are to be directed primarily toward incorporating those who 
have thus far participated only very partially, or even remained 
entirely outside the system. The possibilities, and the inherent 
conflict in existing circumstances can be easily illustrated. 
2. Concentrating investment and technology 
in the modern sector J 
As one possibility, suppose that the basic development strategy 
is to concentrate on modern type production, with the expectation 
that sustained rapid growth will progressively absorb the rest of 
the labour force until the economy is fully integrated at the level 
of the modern sector. A few of the newer trends in the centre 
b/ Although the figures used in the calculations, and the 
assumptions involved, are only rough approximations to simplify 
the discussion, they are in line with available estimates for 
the region. With respect to productivity, numerical estimates 
made by ECLA show that the modern sector, more strictly defined, 
accounted for 12.4 per cent of total employment and 53«3 per 
cent of the gross product toward the end of the 1960's. 
Estimates of the relative size and productivity levels of the 
intermediate and "subsistence" sectors were similar to those 
shown here. Estimates of the distribution of income in the 
region show that the top 20 per cent receive about 60 per cent 
of total income and the poorest 30 per cent only around 5 per 
cent. There is not a perfect correlation between income and 
productivity of course, but the different estimates do indicate 
that this is approximately the extent of concentration which 
exists in the region. 
/countries are 
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countries are discouraged, and some measures are taken to improve 
techniques in the non-modern areas, but these aspects are secondary 
to the main effort. The general development strategy, and the 
focus of technological policy, is on keeping the modern sector 
competitive and expanding its size as rapidly as possible. 
In numerical terms the following assumptions would coincide 
with a strategy of this sort. Productivity in the modern sector 
would advance in line with that in the centre countries, at a rate 
of 2.5 per cent per annum. This means that productivity in the 
modern sector would remain at about three-quarters the economy wide 
average of a typical centre country. Productivity in the intermediate 
and "subsistence" sectors would be maintained relative to that of 
the modern sector; that is, productivity in these areas too would 
increase at a 2.5 per cent rate. To the extent that the economy-
wide growth rate permitted, investment would be used to upgrade 
individual members of the labour force, some passing from the 
"subsistence" to the intermediate sector and others from the 
intermediate to the modern sector. 
It is worth noting that these are fairly moderate assumptions. 
Productivity (and income) levels in the intermediate and "subsistence" 
sectors advance in line with those of the modern sector - and this 
has not always been the case in the past. More important perhaps, 
productivity in the modern sector does not advance any closer to 
the levels of the centre countries. A more aggressive policy could 
well push for full competitiveness with the centre countries, 
particularly to be able to compete in world markets, and this 
would further reduce the absorptive capacity of the modern sector. 
Suppose then that with this strategy it is possible to achieve 
a prolonged period of steady and rapid growth - 7 per cent per 
annum in aggregate terms or 4.2 per cent per annum in terms of 
average productivity per member of the labour force. From 1970 to 
the end of the century the composition and productivity of the 
labour force would then change as follows (figures for a developed 
country and the average figures for the region are repeated for easy 
comparison): 
/Production per 
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6 920 14 510 
1 735 5 960 
5 200 10 900 







The modern sector could advance greatly in these conditions» 
Not only would productivity levels within the sector somewhat more 
than double, but the proportion of the total labour force engaged 
in the sector would rise from 20 per cent to about 45 per cent at 
the end of the century« Even so, well over half the labour force 
would still remain outside the modern sector after 30 years, with 
an important proportion remaining in the "subsistence" sector« This 
majority of the labour force would still be engaged in activities 
where productivity was sharply lower than in the modern sector so 
that the disparities in income levels would almost certainly 
continue to be very large. 
This example illustrates the attractions, as well as the 
shortcomings of growth centered on the modern sector. It is 
perfectly possible for a part of the population to follow the 
consumption patterns of the developed countries; and if a rapid 
growth can be maintained additional segments of the population can 
be incorporated at an increasing rate. Indeed, if the rate of 
population increase should decline substantially, and the rapid 
growth continue for a further 30 years or so (beyond the year 2000), 
there would be good prospects of integrating the entire population 
into the modern sector. That is, favourable population trends and 
/a steady 
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a steady and rapid rate of expansion would in fact hold out the 
prospect of "catching up" with the advanced countries about one-
third of the way into the next century» 
It needs to be emphasized that the absorption power of the 
modern sector depends heavily on the achievement of a rapid increase 
in the overall level of productivity (which in turn depends mostly 
on the total growth rate). If, instead of the 4.2 per cent increase 
per annum assumed above, the calculations are made at progressively 
lower rates the results are as follows: 
Percentage composition of the 
Annual percentage . labour force in 2000 







4.2 45 35 20 
3.2 29 46 25 
2.5 20 50 30 
The percentage absorbed by the modern sector falls rapidly with a 
decline in the overall growth rate, and should productivity increase 
at the lowest rate shown there would be no change at all in the 
structure of the labour force over the 30 year period. Incomes 
within each sector would increase at the rate of 2.5 per cent a 
year, but there would be no reduction in the disparities between the 
different sectors} the great bulk of the labour force would remain 
in the intermediate and "subsistence" areas with productivity (and 
income) levels sharply below those of the modern sector. The 
modern sector would continue to provide highly attractive new goods 
to a minority, but this minority would remain a constant, rather 
than an expanding, proportion of the whole. 
/Nor should 
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Nor should it be thought that this lowest figure involves 
overly pessimistic assumptions. If there is no substantial decline 
in the birth rate during the next 10-15 years, or even if this 
occurs but is accompanied by higher female participation rates, 
the labour force will expand at around 3 per cent per annum, on 
average, to the end of the century. If the aggregate growth rate 
should average 5«5 per cent per annum, average productivity would 
then increase at a yearly rate of about 2.5 per cent. For the 
period 1960-1970, for the region aB a whole, the gross product 
increased at 5.4 per cent and in per capita terms at 2.4 per cent 
per annum. The minimum rate shown only implies future achievements 
similar to those of the recent past. The higher rates on which 
most of the discussion is based imply substantial improvements over 
past performance. 
This makes clear the risk, and the major shortcoming, of a 
policy which concentrates investment and technological capacity in 
the modern sector. The risk is that if the economic performance is 
only moderately good the modern sector will remain an enclave, with 
the great bulk of the population continuing in activities with 
sharply lower productivity (and income) levels. The major 
shortcoming is that even a spectacular economic performance will 
require well over half a century to integrate the entire labour 
force into a modern sector which advances in line with developments 
in the centre countries. 
Since achieving a high rate of economic growth is of such 
central importance to the success of a technology policy oriented 
toward the modern sector, it is advisable to examine, even if only 
very briefly, the economic feasibility of accelerated growth for 
the region. In very general terms this has already been donej 
here the question can be approached via two major, but more specific, 
components of the economy. The first is via investment requirements 
and the ability to finance these requirements. Since the projected 
rapid growth rate is about 30 per cent higher than that for the 
1960'S, this means that investment, as a percentage of the gross 
/product, would 
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product, would probably have to increase substantially. A sharp 
increase could be avoided only if the capital/output ratio could 
be correspondingly reduced, and this is unlikely with growth, and 
investment, concentrated on the modern sector« 
If the investment coefficient does rise substantially then 
this increase will have to be financed, either by an increase in 
the internal savings ratio or by an increased inflow of foreign 
capital. A large increase in the internal savings ratio is 
difficult to achieve with a modern biased growth pattern. The 
importance of the demonstration effect, product differentiation 
with its frequent model changes, and the continuing flow of new 
goods are all aspects of modsrn industrial society which exert 
pressure for spending; and so tend to depress potential savings 
ratios. This aspect has already been discussed in more detail in 
Chapter I. The alternative is an increased inflow of foreign 
capital, and the probability seems high that this would be a 
feature of rapid modern oriented growth. Recent Brazilian 
experience tends to confirm this expectation. 
The second aggregate way of examining the feasibility of 
very rapid growth is through the foreign sector. It has been common 
experience in Latin America, as well as elsewhere, that accelerated 
growth leads to a more than proportionate rise in imports, and 
these must be financed, either by rising export earnings or 
rising inflows of foreign capital. The latter have often provided 
short term relief, but in the longer term the cost of servicing 
the capital inflows tends itself to become a major drain on 
exchange availabilities. Thus rising export earnings become 
crucial, and the external sector has long been regarded as perhaps 
the major bottleneck to the achievement of more rapid growth rates. 
Some of the difficulties likely to be encountered with a 
growth and technological policy oriented toward the modern sector 
can again be placed in perspective by presenting a few numerical 
estimates. Here too favourable assumption are made throughout the 
/exercise; the 
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exercise} the fact that the difficulties are clearly large, even 
with optimistic assumptions, indicates just how serious the obstacles 
are likely to be in this area. 
Suppose, first, that a 7 per cent total growth rate could be 
sustained with exports expanding at the rate of 8.5 per cent per 
annum. This is likely to be a minimum figure. Modern type growth 
involves large import requirements and financial payments, and as 
rapid growth would progressively expand the relative size of the 
modern area, exchange requirements are certain to increase faster 
than total production. In the past the gap has tended to be 
significantly larger than that assumed here and growth has 
frequently had to be curbed because of insufficient foreign 
exchange availabilities. 
At the moment raw materials provide the bulk of Latin American 
exports, but there is little prospect that exports of this sort can 
expand at anything like the projected 8.5 per cent rate. On the 
demand size, the assumed rate of growth for the centre countries 
is only 3 per cent per annum, and although an increasing need to 
import basic commodities as domestic supplies are exhausted will 
raise demand somewhat, it is not likely to vary much from this 
3 per cent figure in volume terms. 
On the supply side it is doubtful that Latin America could 
sustain a very rapid increase in raw materials exports for a 
prolonged period. The projection implies a more than seven-fold 
increase in total production in the region by the"end of the 
century, and this will itself involve enormous demands on available 
materials supplies. Resources will have to be more carefully 
preserved, and the additional amounts which can be exported are 
likely to be limited, even if there is adequate external demand. 
In this situation relative prices for primary commodities 
may well show a long-term improvement, but this will no longer be 
an unmixed advantage to the region; with the rapid industrialization 
projected, the region will itself become a major consumer and so 
from this standpoint adversely affected bjr rising materials costs. 
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Talcing all these considerations into account, exports of 
primary commodities have been projected to increase at 5 per cent 
per annum, again probably an optimist assumption. 
The difference would have to be accounted for by industrial 
exports, and it is here that the obstacles are apt to be greatest. 
Over the 30 year period industrial exports would have to rise to 
more than 60 times the 1970 level - at an average rate of increase 
of 15 per cent per annum. They would account for two-thirds of 
the regions exports at the end of the century. Such an increase 
would again be difficult from both the demand and from the supply 
side. 
It is the problems of supply that are more generally known 
- all the difficulties involved in reducing costs, maintaining . 
quality, and devising marketing techniques so as to be able to 
compete in the world market for industrial products. But when 
considering an increase in industrial exports of the size suggested, 
the difficulties faced from the demand side are probably at least 
as serious. 
The problem can be clearly seen by noting the implications 
for the region's share of total world trade in industrial products. 
If world trade in industrial products is projected to increase at 
5 per cent per annum,5/ this would mean that Latin America's share 
of this total would rise from 1 per cent in 1970 to 15 per cent at 
the end of the century. If some increase in the share of other 
developing regions is also postulated, then the share of the centre 
countries in world industrial exports would have to drop very 
sharply. From about 95 per cent of the total in 1970 this would 
This rate of increase is lower than that of the recent past, 
a reflection of the lov/er growth rate projected for the 
centre countries. It has been assumed these countries will 
grow at the rate of only 3 per cent ppr annum, and-as they 
account for the great bulk of world trnde in industrial 
products, such trade must also be expected to increase less 
rapidly than in the, past. 
/have to 
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have to fall to 75 per cent or less by the end of the century. That 
is, for Latin America to achieve an increase in industrial exports 
of the size required, the centre countries would have to accept a 
large decline in their own share of such trade; and Latin America 
would probably also have to be given a preferencial position 
vis-a-vis the other developing areas. 
Relative changes of this magnitude would not necessarily be 
voluntarily accepted by the rest of the world and it would be 
difficult to force the changes required. Exports to third markets 
might be substantially increased if the region could become 
sufficiently competitive, but the largest markets for industrial 
exports would continue to be the home markets of the centre 
countries, and there is no easy way of forcing entry into those 
markets. Judging from recent experience it seems more likely that 
the rest of the world would resist rather than passively accept a 
large scale incursion of this sort into world markets for industrial 
products. 
It is thus difficult to be very optimist about the prospects 
for the achievement of very rapid modern sector oriented growth in 
the region as a whole, and so difficult to be enthusiastic about a 
technology policy concentrated heavily on the modern area. Although 
there is little doubt that much could be achieved, the proportion 
of the total population which could be incorporated into the modern 
sector would probably continue to be disappointing, and great 
disparities in income levels would probably continue to prevail. 
But here again it is necessary to note that what seems 
unlikely for the region as a whole might be much more possible 
for a single country. Special conditions in any respect might 
ease the difficulties, but it needs to be pointed out that with 
respect to the crucial problem of the external sector this is 
true in a special sense. It is quite possible that one or two 
countries could establish themselves as export centers for the 
region. The restraints of the world market would then be less 
important as the exports of a single country, even if growing 
/rapidly, are 
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rapidly, are a smaller factor than when considering exports of the 
entire region. That the restraints would not be removed is clear 
from past experience of even small countries in world markets for 
industrial goods, but they would certainly be less severe. 
3. A growth pattern oriented toward the 
non-modern areas 
An exercise similar to that presented above, but dealing with 
a growth pattern oriented toward the non-mcdern sectors of the 
economy, readily illustrates the different nature of the results. 
Shiftir-.g the center of attention away from the modern sector still 
leaves considerable scope for variation in the exact pattern of 
growth, and here it will be assumed that a fairly moderate version 
is followed. This would involve the following central characteristics. 
New products and processes in the centre countries are screened 
carefully, and only those judged to be of particular benefit are 
introduced into the region. But this inflow, combined with 
internal investment and technological efforts, is enough to permit 
a continued, if slower, advance of the modern sector itself. In 
numerical terms it is assumed that productivity in the modern sector 
rises by about one-quarter, and employment expands so that the 
sector absorbs 25 per cent of the labour force at the end of the 
century. The increase in productivity is an average, and would 
permit sharp rises in some activities while techniques in others 
remained relatively unchanged. Overall it would permit a modest 
rise in incomes even for those already incorporated into the modern 
sector at the beginning of the period. 
In the rest of the economy the objective would be first, to 
absorb all those in the "subsistence" area into the intermediate 
sector, and second, to raise productivity levels in the intermediate 
sector as much as possible. Shifting those engaged in "subsistence" 
type activities elsewhere would reflect the idea that most of these 
are not very amenable to diroct efforts to raise productivity. For 
example, in the urban areas much of the "subsistence" labour force 
is engaged in service activities of only marginal value, and more 
/productive opportunities 
- 98 -* 
productive opportunities need to be provided. In the rural areas 
much of the "subsistence" sector is the result of land holdings 
which are too small and improvement depends on land reform measures, 
expanded opportunities for rural artisan type activities, etc. The 
first aspect would then mean expanding the size of the intermediate 
sector so as to absorb the "subsistence" area, thus raising income 
levels of the poorest group in the economy. The second aspect would 
mean raising productivity (and income) levels in the intermediate 
sector itself. 
The results would of course again depend on how high a rate 
of overall economic expansion could be achieved. The possibilities 
can be illustrated with calculations using the same alternative 
growth rates as before: a 4.2 per cent annual increase in overall 
productivity (which implies a 7 per cent rate of growth of the gross 
product), and two progressively lower figures. The results of the 
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5 960 4 460 3 640 
6 500 6 500 6 500 
5 780 3 780 2 690 
In all three variants it is assumed the "subsistence" group is 
completely absorbed into the intermediate sector by the end of the 
century. If it were possible to achieve a total growth rate of 
7 per cent, productivity in the intermediate sector itself could be 
raised to quite close to the level prevailing in the modern sector 
/- that is, 
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- that is, by the end of the century the economy could be approaching 
full homogeneity. With lower rates of growth the advance of the 
intermediate sector is progressively less, but even in the least 
favourable of the three possibilities shown productivity in the 
intermediate sector rises to more than 40 per cent that of the 
modern sector at the end of the century. This compares with an 
initial 1970 situation in which productivity in the intermediate 
sector was less thai.; or-e~quarter that of the modern sector and a 
large "subsistence" sector existed with a productivity level less 
than one-twentieth that of the modern sector. 
This makes clear the major advantage of an investment and 
technology policy oriented toward the non-modern areas of the 
economyi the great disparities in productivity and income levels 
which presently characterize the region could be progressively and 
rather rapidly narrowed. Even if very high aggregate grov/th rates 
could not be achieved, very substantial progress could still be made 
in this direction. The disappointment of course would be that, even 
though some advance within the modern sector is projected, this is 
moderate, and productivity levels fall progressively further behind 
those in the centre countries. By the end of the century they 
would be only about 60 per cent of the economy-wide average in a 
typical centre country, and there would no longer be a large group 
in the region whose living patterns were closely similar to those 
which would then prevail in the high income countries of the world. 
The external sector would be a less serious obstacle to rapid 
growth if the orientation were of this sort. The production pattern 
and the technology used would diverge increasingly from those of the 
centre countries, and so the necessity to import technology, equipment, 
special materials, etc. from those countries would also be less. 
There would therefore be less pressure to expand exports to the 
centre countries. A more basic type of import substitution could 
occur, and trade could more naturally expand on an intra-regional 
basis. 
/The major 
The major obstacles to a rapid growth of t M s sort are likely 
to be of an internal nature and do not lend themselves to even crude 
quantitative exercises. In opting for such a strategy, Latin America 
would be largely charting a novel course, away from the economic 
dynamics that have dominated its growth since the mid-l9th century. 
In very general terms, it would be embarking on major policy and 
institutional changes along either socialistic or, alternatively, 
some variant of a nationalistic pattern. Even if the popular 
conciencia needed to support such radical deviation from the past 
were to spring up quickly, the new strategy would still have to 
probo its way in a quite different national and international 
environment from that which confronto! any of the foreign examplars. 
It would be foolish to reject all further access to foreign 
technology, hence new selective arrangemexits would have to be worked 
out with those major creators and repositories of that technology, 
the multinational companies. This would obviously be a difficult, 
painful process. Neither can it be expected that intensive efforts 
to promote indigenous technological creativity would quickly bear 
fruit. The capacity of the non-modern areas of the economy to absorb 
new techniques and organizational improvements is another limiting 
factor. Translating vague popular enthusiasm for the new strategy 
into a willingness to accept reduced access to the latest foreign 
creations is still another, as is also the problem of sustaining 
work commitment among the managerial and technical classes in the 
face of such austerity. The development of policy and institutional 
innovations for. solidifying the effort, and the creation of a 
bureaucracy adequate for the strategy, are other obstacles high on 
the list. The list could be extended further, but the above 
illustrates the type of dominant obstacles that an effective 
strategy of this sort would have to overcome. 
It should be noted, however, that with respect to technological 
policy alone it is likely to prove easier to stimulate creative 
technological efforts within the region with a development pattern 
of this sort than if growth continues to be concentrated on the 
/modern sector. 
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modern sector. The objectives are clearer, the tendency to follow 
the latest advance in the centre countries and import the new 
techniques is replaced by the need to examine conditions in the 
non-modern areas and devise appropriate techniques for improving 
these conditions. The scientific, technical, and capital 
requirements for truly creative technological advance of this 
sort are bound to be much less onerous than those required to 
conduct creative research along the lines followed in the centre 
countries, and which would have to be duplicated if technological 
\ 
creativity with growth centered on the modern sector continues to 
be the goal. 
Even if it is assumed that the difficulties of working out 
a new pattern of growth are likely to limit the aggregate growth 
rate to the lowest of the illustrative figures presented above 
(2.5 per cent per annum in terms of average productivity increase), 
this would still permit technical progress to significantly 
improve the material well-being of a much larger proportion of 
the population than could all out modern-sector-based growth. It 
would also equip the region, after a period of time, with a richer 
and more broadly distributed capacity for accelerating productivity 
increases in subsequent years than would continuing with the 




SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR THE TECHNOLOGICAL POLICY OF 
LATIN AMERICA IN THE COMING DECADES 
The notable emergence in the past decade of policy measures 
in Latin American countries to modify the costs and content of 
their technology, has concentrated mainly on three aspects of the 
region's complex technology problems: improving the "technological 
term3 of trade", expanding the channels for disseminating 
technological information to local producers and enlarging the 
cadres of scientists and high-level technical personnel. The basic 
rational guiding these policies has been the technological gap 
approach in combination with the view that the semi-monopolistic 
international market for technology requires countervailing power 
by the state to strengthen the weak bargaining position of local 
producers as purchasers of foreign technology. As yet the direct 
promotion of indigenous creativity as a partial substitute for 
technological importing, ha3 played a subordinate role in most 
countries. There are some exceptions, most notably Peru, which 
with the recent establishment of IK'TINTEC seems to have shifted 
its emphasis to promoting domestic industrial innovation, but the 
Peruvian case is as yet atypical. 
The basic implication of the analysis of this document is, 
however, that a substantial capacity to adapt and create technology 
is crucial for development strategies that aim for broad-based 
socio-ecoBoraic growth. Hence its corrolary is that Latin American 
technology policy must alter its order of priorities and begin 
focusing on methods to stimulate that capacity. 
It should of course be apparent that quick payoffs from such 
efforts are unlikely, but rather that the revfards will cumulate 
over time. Initially, the payoffs will be restrained by 
inexperience as well as by the long gestation and high failure 
rates that characterise i&covative efforts even in societies 
with long experience at creating technology. But even more 
/basically, the 
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basically, the pace of the Latin American effort will be constrained 
by the socio-economic obstacles analyzed in earlier sections,. 
Nevertheless, the effort need not wait for mass attitudinal 
conversion and wholesale institutional changes to set the stage. 
There are openings even within the existing socio-economic setting 
to start redirecting and amplifying technological strategy, and in 
so doing, to help favourably to alter the setting. 
In identifying such openings, it is useful to distinguish the 
productive areas where lack of adequate technological information 
Is a key obstacle to improving social productivity, from those in 
which decision biases of the enterprises are the chief obstacle. In 
the first areas, institutions that provide direct technical 
assistance, data banks, and other means of enriching the flow of 
information could be quite effective» In the second areas, the 
attempt to supply such information will be largely met with 
indifference by the potential recipients, since they are already 
plugged into informational networks suitable for their purposes. 
The distinction overlaps the division between the public and the 
private sector, although the nature of the main constraining 
decision biases differs between the two sectors» 
1 » Initial openings for technological policies 
for the private sector 
In the private sector, the difference in cutlook is basically 
determined by the position of the firm in its market. Large firms 
producing for the local market are typically engaged in oligopolistic 
market strategies. Indeed such firms are the main private channels 
for importing foreign technology, since their continued participation 
in product differentiation competition critically depends on 
replenishing product lines from abroad. Well-established informational 
channels link them to foreign sources of new technology? to the 
multinational headquarters in the case of foreign subsidiaries, 
and to foreign licensors in the case of domestically-owned firms. 
/Obtaining technology 
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Obtaining technology through t h e s e channels has two 
overwhelming advantages f o r the f irm over c o l l a b o r a t i n g in c r e a t i v e 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l e f f o r t s with l o c a l technology i n s t i t u t e s . One i s t h a t 
i t r e c e i v e s as a package a w e l l - t e s t e d p r o c e s s or product 
accompanied by exper t a s s i s t a n c e i n product ion l a y o u t , t r o u b l e -
s h o o t i n g , q u a l i t y c o n t r o l and market ing, a t a more or l e s s 
p r e d i c t a b l e u n i t c o s t . The second i s t h a t the l i c e n s e s o f t e n 
inc lude e x c l u s i v e d i s t r i b u t i o n r i g h t s i n the l o c a l market . These 
advantages g r e a t l y lower investment u n c e r t a i n t y f o r the f i rm i n 
s t a y i n g a b r e a s t o f l o c a l o l i g o p o l i s t i c c o m p e t i t i o n . I f these 
market c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s cont inue to p r e v a i l i t i s hard to s e e how 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l i n s t i t u t e s can, by simply o f f e r i n g t e c h n o l o g i c a l 
s e r v i c e s , e s t a b l i s h more than marginal r e l a t i o n s h i p s with the l a r g e 
p r i v a t e f i r m s . 
The r e t a r d i n g e f f e c t on l o c a l i n v e n t i v e n e s s o f these 
a l t e r n a t i v e channels i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the Argentine p a t e n t data 
o f t a b l e 3» In 1949 i n d i v i d u a l i n v e n t o r s were awarded over h a l f 
the t o t a l p a t e n t s granted i n Argent ina . This high percentage was 
probably a r e s i d u e of the temporary s t imulus to l e g a l i n v e n t i v e n e s s 
o f World War I I when a c c e s s to imported equipment and technology 
was abrupt ly c u r t a i l e d . By the 1 9 6 0 ' s , however, the annual 
number o f p a t e n t s granted to i n d i v i d u a l s had dropped to l i t t l e 
more than h a l f the 1949 f i g u r e , and to around 25 per c e n t o f the 
t o t a l number o f p a t e n t s granted by A r g e n t i n a . 1 / 
T h e . c o n t r i b u t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l i n v e n t o r to post -war 
Argent ina technology dec l ined even more than the d e c l i n i n g p a t e n t 
t rend i n d i c a t e s . A sample survey of the Argentine i n v e n t o r s , 
taken the l a t e 1 9 6 0 ' s , showed t h a t most were p a r t - t i m e amateurs , 
and t h a t only a small percentage o f t h e i r patented d e v i c e s 
reached commercial a p p l i c a t i o n . Very few o f these were l i c e n s e d 
1 / A s i m i l a r post-war d e c l i n e i s repor ted i n a Chi lean survey. 
See CORFO, La propiedad i n d u s t r i a l en Chi le y su impacto en 
e l d e s a r r o l l o i n d u s t r i a l ( S a n t i a g o , September 1 9 7 0 ) . Mimeo. 
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or sold, but rather were mainly put into production by the 
inventors, typically on a small-scale. The small-scale reflected 
not merely limited access to finance, but also the fact that most 
of the devices were gadgets with limited markets, or were minor 
improvements of accessories for moter cars and durable household 
and commercial goods.2/ 
Moreover, only a small proportion of the patenting in post-
war Argentina by enterprises represented locally developed 
alternatives. As a signatory of the Paris Convention on Intellectual 
Property Rights, Argentina had committed itself to protect foreign 
patenters by permitting them to re-patent locally innovations 
developed abroad, and thus to control their use in Argentina. 
.The major proportion of the Argentina patents granted to firms 
were extensions of foreign patents rather than locally developed 
innovations. As is indicated in table 3t the percentage of 
patents obtained by foreign firms actively engaged in the 
repatenting effort (firms receiving 10 or more patent each), rose 
sharply between 19^9 and 196?. The majority of the patented 
innovations were not used in Argentina during the period covered. 
Rather they protected the pateator technological pirating, 
and gave him a legal bases for hindering efforts to modify or 
improve his patented 
processes or products by other Argentine 
forms.3/ 
To overcome such adverse relationships requires a closer 
collaboration between economic and technology policies than has 
been characteristic of most Latin American countries to-date. In 
general terms, economic policies would have to go much beyond 
trying to subsidise R & D by private firms in order to seduce 
Jorge Katz, Aportarj.on deenología. Appendi za j e local 
e industrializaclSn dependiente « Instituto Torcuato di 
Telìa, Buenos Aires, 1971, Chapter X. 
Jorge Katz, Importación de tecnología. Aprendizaje local 






them into investing in such efforts. The lavishness of the subsidies 
needed to achieve such seduction would most probably far exceed the 
social benefits obtained, sinoe the subsidized local technology 
would merely reduce some of the foreign exchange cost of product 
substitution chaining. More socially potent results, would at 
least require the subsidies to be complemented with policies 
restricting access of large firms to foreign technology, whether 
through special taxes or other measures, in order to force them, , 
f aut e de mieux, to engage in local creativity, and to become more 
interested in using the creations of other local innovators. This 
would, in turn, raise the need to establish priorities for both 
technological importing and local E & D subsidies, a difficult 
task requiring close collaboration between national economic and 
technological planning agencies. Barring the development of such 
complementary economic policies, technology policy perse would be 
well advised to cast its seed on less stony ground than the large 
firm selling mainly to the internal market.. 
There is, however, one important exception, industrial exporting, 
where even the large Latin American firm would be a small, marginal 
supplier. Its main concerns therefore would not be with product 
exclusivity and market shares, but with the oppressively large 
financial costs and risks of exporting to highly competitive markets} 
e.g., its limited knowledge of foreign market characteristics, the 
heavy cost of foreign marketing cutlets, and the difficulties of 
staying abreast of the changing designs and cost characterizing 
export markets. In this area the large firm is less likely to 
disdain local technological collaboration, especially since the 
alternative, foreign licensing, usually contains clauses restricting 
exporting of the licensed product. Technological assistance per se 
would, however, not go very far in overcoming the reluctance of firms 
to venture into exporting:, Institutional innovations paralleling 
the various functions performed for Japanese industrial exporting 
by the Zaibatsu would probably also be required. Among these central 
functions would be the provision of foreign technological intelligence 
/and assistance 
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and assistance in creating and adapting products for export. The 
Zaibatsu-type effort would need to be selective, concentrating the 
nation's limited resources on more promising ranges of industrial 
products. As these are likely to encompass mainly less scale and 
skill intensive products, the industrial 'exporting effort could be 
a potentially important alleviant of the pressing employment problem. 
The response of the foreign subsidiary, on the other hand, is 
likely to remain as stony to offers of local technological help in 
exporting as in production for internal markets. One reason is that 
for either need, the siibsidiary has direct access to a much richer 
and more experienced collection of B & D talent at company 
headquarters than is likely to be available in Latin American 
countries for some decades. The second reason is that exclusivity 
and capitalizing on monopolies of technological knowledge loom large 
in the strategies of multinational companies in export as well as 
domestic marketing. They are, after all, oligopolistic firms on a 
world scale. Given adequate inducements, they could contribute 
usefully to product redesigning for both domestic and export markets, 
but their technological effort would remain centered in headquarters 
abroad.' 
Another potentially fertile area of industry for technological 
collaboration is small and medium enterprise. Such firms are usually 
too miniscule to worry about market shares and technological 
exclusivity, and are also too small to interest foreign licensors. 
Hence they subsist with ur.derscale plants and old equipment through 
paying lower wages and evading taxes more vigorously than large firms, 
and, in come cases, by ingenious pirating and copying of modern 
product designs'. Effective technological collaboration would require 
parallel organisational innovations, e.g. producer co-operatives and 
special, financial institutions to assist the rationalization of 
production. Models for this can be found in similar efforts of many 
post-war European countries, notably in France. The technological 
adaptations need notv indeed should not, be directed toward high 
technology. Indeed, the intermediate sector could well be the place 
/to begin 
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to begin experimenting with product simplification and the descaling 
for processes. The base for the technological effort could often be 
older product designs and processes that the centre countries have 
since replaced with more complex ones» Knowledge about such products 
and processes is now largely in the public domain, although 
considerable data collecting would be needed to establish an adequate 
information base from which to select suitable products and processes 
for modification to local needs. 
Further down the technological ladder, a potentially fruitful 
area is the "subsistence sector". This sector includes marginal 
urban activities, but its main base is still rural, in agricultural 
minifundia and village artisan industries. The two combined in loose 
economic symbiosis to form the most backward and impoverished part of 
Latin American society. The "subsistence sector" lacks virtually all 
the requisite inputs for elevating its productivity and material 
well-being: lack of access to superior technical information, to skills 
and finance for exploiting such knowledge, and to group organisation 
for generating the requisite inputs. The "subsistence sector" is both 
the main repository of rural underemployment anl the chief source of 
the indigestibly rapid flow of migrants to the provincial cities and 
metropoli of the region. Yet the absolute size of the rural 
"subsistence sector" keeps increasing at an annual rate of about 
1.5 per cent. Apart from efforts complementing agrarian reform in some 
Latin American countries, the minifundia remains a n3gj.ected area for 
technological policy: in the case of rural artisan industry the 
neglect is almost total. 
As in the other areas, technical help would have to come in a 
package that includes the other inputs. The basic objective should 
be to reproduce the dynamic interaction between agriculture and rural 
industry that was the dominant feature of Period I industrialization. 
In that era, however, the dynamics were sparked by the wealthier and 
more technologically alert segments of agriculture and industry. By 
contrast, the Latin American rural "subsistence sector" represents 
the most impoverished and technologically stagnant part of agriculture 
/and industry 
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and industry. The dynamics have, therefore, to be mainly sparked 
from without, although once the underutilized labour, and the native 
ingenuity that lie buried under centuries-old layers of poverty, 
apathy and suspicion, begins to be mobilized, the momentum could 
begin to be carried forward from within. 
Technological progress in this sector does not require 
sophisticated new techniques, but rather modest but successive 
improvements of existing techniques in both the minifundia and the 
artisan industries. In the initial period, the guiding objective 
should be iniprovements that the "subsistence sector" could largely 
reproduce with locally available materials and skills. In this way 
the initial social cost of minifundia and artisan capital 
accumulation would be kept low, since the major inputs would be labour 
time from underemployed labour to produce the materials and equipment; 
while local ingenuity and enterprise would be stimulated rather than 
overwhelmed. The technological task requires, therefore, very 
detailed knowledge of local socio-economic conditions. Organizationally 
this calls for close collaboration between anthropologists, 
agricultural economists, engineers and agronomists. 
Here is one part of the national technological effort for which 
the prima facie ease for subsidization for some decades is 
a -r.tme.Kr. i,ii»m»ii , m p m 
overwhelming. Not only would the social cost of capital accumulation 
by the "subsistence sector" be far less that the nominal market cost 
in the early phases, but the social benefits would also fsr exceed 
the market value of increased "subsistence sector" output. .For the 
benefits would also include a dampening of the rate of exodus of 
rural labour and hence of the severe socic-econoEic costs that the 
exodus has been generating in urban areas. 
Finally, since the "intermediate" and "subsistence" sectors 
of various Latin American countries have many features in common, 
there is a strong basis for regional collaboration between national 
technological efforts, for frequent exchanges of experiences and 
solutions. This could accelerate the payoffs from these efforts in 
in each of the countries. Indeed, in these aspects of the strategy, 
/many smaller 
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many smaller countries of the region could play a major role in the 
institutional and technological innovating. 
Detailed knowledge of similar efforts in other continents could 
also be useful in guiding the Latin American effort. For example, 
although the cultural milieu and the guiding ideologies are quite 
different from Latin America's analyses of the comprehensive attempts 
of China and Tanzania to replicate Period I type dynamic interactions 
between peasant agriculture and rural artisanry might well be helpful 
in formulating the Latin American efforts. There are, however, various 
limitations, identified in section 3 below, to applying the commune 
structure in the Latin American rural setting. Institutional 
innovation rather than direct copying of foreign models is also 
required for effective radical reformism. 
2« Openings for technological policies for 
the public sector 
The decision biases of public sector enterprises and agencies 
militating against indigenous technological creativity t.-:e of a 
different order than in the private sector. In the public sector . 
they derive from an excessive propensity of high-level Latin American 
technicians and scientists to take their cues concerning the choice 
of technology and of scientific research projects from their 
confreres in the centre countries. As a result, the potential of 
these cadres for assisting Latin American social and economic 
development remains seriously underutilized. The general solution 
lies in greater awareness of the nature and consequences of the 
decision biases along with policy measures to constrain the exercise 
of these biases. 
Large public sector "dukedoms", such as public works, 
transportation, and telecommunications ministries, have had a 
considerable amount of autonomy in choosing designs and equipment 
for their projects and. in obtaining external finance from the World 
Bank and from centre countries supplying equipment and technical 
consultation. Since the "dukedoms" are usually headed by engineers 
and can envelop their decisions in a thick fog of technological 
/expertise that 
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expertise that tends to overwhelm supervisory financial agencies 
like the Treasury and Central Bank, and economic supervisory agencies 
like national planning boards, the "dukedoms" have considerable scope 
for exercising their professional biases toward modern techniques and 
equipment as they strive to catch up with "the engineering Jonases" 
of the centre countries. Supervision is largely limited to budgetary 
controls that govern the pace with which projects are undertaken and, 
to some extent, their individual scope, but has had much less influence 
on the techniques used to carry them out. The "dukedoms" have thus 
had considerable freedom to opt for labour saving and import intensive 
techniques in carrying out the approved projects. 
Yet civil engineering is one important activity where the 
potential range of alternative techniques is quite wide. Until the 
20th century, civil engineering required the directing of large bodies 
of men, working with hand tools and a modest amount of specialized 
heavy equipment. This sort of mass labour handling skill has become 
obsolete in centre countries, though it is being revived Ingeniously, 
in some regions of the underdeveloped world. Labour intensive • •• 
techniques in earth moving, grading, reforestation, track-laying and 
other phases of public projects, could play a much greater role in 
absorbing labour and in minimizing foreign exchange pressures than they 
have in Latin America in recent years. 
Devising workable solutions for the difficult logistics and 
management problems would not be easy, but the social imperative for 
Latin American civil engineers to turn their ingenuity in this direction 
is mounting with each year's increment to underemployment. It may be 
that even with ingenuity and experience,, such techniques would still 
increase budgetary costs and delay project completion. But to the 
customer, the Latin American government, the social benefits of 
higher employment and reduced foreign exchange outlays should compensate 
for at least a fair elevation of project costs. What is needed is 
awareness of the possibilities, decisions to experiment along such 
lines, and tighter controls over the selection of techniques by the 
supervisory agencies. One of the tasks that national science-
/technology councils 
- 113 -
technology councils could usefully assume would be to serve as 
advisors to the national planning boards and financial agencies, 
reviewing the technical aspects of proposed projects for dispensible 
modernization biases. 
A similar function could be performed for telecommunications. 
The dismal state of Latin American T-V programming - a poor copy of 
the bad U.S. model - is an object lesson in the social costs of being 
seduced by the glamour of technological hardware, to the exclusion of 
adequate consideration of "software" problems, that is, of the uses 
to which the hardware is put. In most Latin American countries, the 
government, pursuaded by the argument that television was, a 
potentially powerful instrument for advancing popular education and 
culture, pioneered in the establishment of the initial television 
transmitters, which in turn, stimulated the sale of receivers. 
Government pioneering thus overcame the "critical mass" obstacle to 
the spread of private transmitters and the entry of commercial 
television. Concurrently, the financially pressed governments decided 
that they could no longer afford the programming costs of keeping 
television within the public sector. The original educational and 
culltural objectives largely faded away, and within a few years Latin 
American television was converted into a powerful new sales device for 
accelerating product differentiation. 
Latin American and other Third World countries are now being 
pressed to invest in communication satellites for extending television 
to rural areas beyond the range of urban television transmitters. 
Again the emphasis by enthusiasts in engineering and commercial circles 
is on the potential educational benefits. A valuable extension of the 
functions of national science-technology advisory councils could be to 
help dissolve the technological mystique surrounding such proposals by 
analysing carefully the "software" implications of these glamour 
technologies. 
The extension of rural telephone networks illustrates a somewhat 
different aspects of the social cost of the technological hardvrare bias. 
The case for providing such service is quite pursuasive: it would 
/facilitate emergency 
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facilitate emergency communication with isolated districts as well as 
provide more mundane conveniences to the inhabitants of the districts. 
But one of the influential proponents of extending such services, the 
International Telecommunications Union, also advises that the 
appropriate local equipment should be small automatic centrals, since 
these would obviate the need to employ voice operators, and since such 
automatic exchanges are being produced en masse by the major telephone 
equipment companies, the suppliers of technological expertise to the 
ITU.4/ As it happens, labour saving is not a current social desideratum 
under Third World employment conditions, while a voice operator could 
often perform the task of transmitting emergency messages with greater 
flexibility than an automatic system. Indeed in isolated districts of 
centre countries, compatible manual exchanges are still in operation 
today. The much simpler designs for such exchanges are also now public 
domain technology. Since the major Latin American countries now produce 
part of their telephonic equipment, it should be possible for thea to 
adapt these simple manual exchanges and supply them to rural areas of 
the region at less domestic cost and with considerable foreign exchange 
savings. An alert national science-technology council could usefully 
take on the function of exploring cases such as the above for 
opportunities to economize on social costs, enlarge the range of 
indigenous technology and augment employment. 
The various linkages between science and technology offer still 
other opportunities for rationalizing decisions of the public sector. 
Today in the centre countries, while applied science often plays a 
direct role in generating modern technology, the contributions of basic 
science remains more distant and diffused. Nevertheless, the distance 
has been shortening in recent decades. It is easy to cite a number of 
k j Cf. ACAST, A Latin American Plan of Action for the Application 
of Science and Technology to Development, United Nations Economic 
and Social Council, E/CN.12/966 (May, 1973), pp. 178-180, for a 
presentation of the ITU position. For a critical analysis of 
ITU's technological biases see Brenda Haddox, "Communications and 




important post-war technologic break-throughts that originated rather 
quickly in earlier advance of basic sciences. For example, solid state 
physics led to the transistor and micro-circuitry, low temperature 
chemistry to cryogenics, wave mechanics to micro-wave transmission and 
laser beams. But such rapid translation of basic scientific advances 
into usable new technology depends on the existence of richly endowed 
cadres of applied scientists and engineers plus private and public firms 
with sophisticated R & D capability to seize upon and develop profitable 
technological dérivations of the scientific advances. As long as the 
latter are lacking, as is the case in Latin America today outside of 
medicine, the yield from one of the potentially important social 
functions of its basic science will continue to' be close in zero in 
Latin America. 
Since a sophisticated Latin American R & D capability is some 
decades away even with optimistic projections as to its rate of 
development, it follows that a rational science technology strategy 
should assign a much lower priority to expanding basic sciences in most 
specialities, and be much mere selective in the expansion, than have 
centre countries. In this regard, the biological sciences are probably 
the most promising area for special empha&is. •-•Not only does the region 
have a fair nucleus of medical personnel and facilities to adapt basic 
advances into practical applications, but the biological sciences could 
also contribute to the development of an innovative.capacity in 
important areas, such as, agriculture, forestry, and biological pest 
controls« 
To date progress in tropical agriculture and forestry has been 
limited to some plantation products mainly for export to the centre 
countries. The basic botanical investigations and agronomical 
experiments for these were done almost exclusively at the initiative 
of the centre countries. Thus far, basic and applied scientific 
research on improving tropical food agriculture and forestry for local 
consumption has been largely neglected. Yet much of Latin America is 
tropical, and extending the agricultural frontier in the tropics could 
bring inmense payoffs in easing the region's employment and balance 
of payments problems. 
/Similarly, the 
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Similarly, the rising price of chemical feed stocks and growing 
concern over the adverse environmental effects of chemical insecticides, 
is turning biological research in centre countries toward developing 
biological pest controls. There is no good reason why researching the 
plant and insect populations of tropical forests and jungles for 
biological alternatives to insecticides should be chiefly left to 
centre country science. This is surely a promising area for Latin 
American science and technology to innovate in developing 
environmentally superior exportable alternatives to insecticides.5/ 
To be sure, other valuable functions of basic science require 
moderate investment to expand areas of lesser immediate priority. 
Growing cadres of basic scientists will be needed to instruct applied 
scientists and technicians, as the universities of the region expand 
such training. Basic physical scientists are urgently needed to advise 
governments in such areas of rapidly advancing science and high 
technology as nuclear energy and communications. Each basic science 
specialty is also a valuable early warning system, providing advice on 
new international developments in their speciality that have long run 
socio-economic potential. When the industrial P & D effort of the 
region reaches a sufficient size and sophistication, various basic 
science specialities could also begin to function as important sources 
of sophisticated scientific information and advice for the R & D 
efforts. Indeed, one promising area probably merits immediate attention . 
- the development of economic solar energy, for which the climate of 
much of Mexico, Argentina, Peru, Bolivia and Chile, is more suitable 
for an economic break-through than are those of the centre countries. 
Hence this research, which has been given low priority in the centre 
countries, affords Latin America a unique opportunity to make an 
important technological contribution to easing the world energy 
11 " • «• * 
For a list of other possibilities, some requiring basic science 
inputs for ecological or technologic purposes, see Ignacy Sachs, 
"Population, Technology, Natural Resources and the Environment" 
in ECLA, Economic Bulletin for Latin America, Vol. XVIII, 
NSS 1 and 2, 1973, pp. 126-138 (United Nations Publication, 
Sales NS 5.73.II.G.3). 
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problem, and to also garner the economic benefits of being a 
pioneering technology exporter. The R & D problem in this area is 
mainly one for engineering and applied physics, but inputs from 
basic physics would probably facilitate the effort. 
The need for at least a modest rate of expansion of its basic 
science establishment poses serious organizational problems for 
Latin America's science-technology effort. To keep basic scientists 
"basic" and up-to-date, they need to remain active in research 
in frequent contact with a minimum critical mass of confrères 
in order to benefit from the intellectual stimulus and the 
interdisciplinary assistance commonly needed for sustained creativity. 
Latin America's chronic scientific brain drain has been in part a 
reaction of many of its best scientists to inadequate equipment and 
intellectual isolation. Creating "centres of excellence", universities 
or institutes that can provide the requisite research equipment and 
intellectual critical mass, with facilities for frequent access to 
the centres by less advantageously located scientists, could 
significantly ease the brain drain problem. This solution has, 
thus far, proved too administratively difficult or costly to implement 
even in Argentina,- Brazil and Mexico, although each has the basic 
economic and intellectual resources to maintain an effective national 
centre. For the small- and middle-sized Latin American countries a 
national centre is out of reach at this stage of their economic 
development, and they must seek co-operative solutions: e.g., a 
subregional "centre of excellence" serving the Andean Blocj and a 
more narrowly specialized one serving Central America. The 
administrative obstacles, political jealousies, and financial 
problems of creating national centres in the large countries are 
multiplied for regional centres. Hence finding innovative ways to 
overcome the national and regional obstacles would be a notable 
contribution of the science-technology councils of the region to 
the partial staunching of the brain drain and to the advancement of 
Latin America's science-technology capability. 
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3. Criteria for selecting between importing and 
creating technology in the modern sector 
Suppose Latin American countries were to begin broad efforts 
to shift from their modern-sector-based "style of development" to an 
anti-dualistic development style, and began, therefore, to make the 
drastic changes of socio-economic policy required to implement the 
new "style"«. Implementation require applying policies influencing 
the choice between importing and creating techniques, and the 
equipment embodying the alternative techniques, to the modern private 
sector, as well as to the "easier" sectors discussed above. Economic 
and technological planners would have, therefore, to devise general 
criteria for guiding the specific selections. 
In very general terras, the planners would still have to strike 
some balance between reducing technological dualism and augmenting 
the rate of economic growth as conventionally measured. In the very 
long run as the economy approached full integration, the two efforts 
would become complementary and the trade-off problem would fade away, 
but in the short and medium run - i.e., for some decades - painful 
choices would have to be made between the relative intensities of the 
two efforts. Resistance from modern sector consumers, work incentive 
problems, limits to the growth of bureaucratic efficiency and similar 
type constraints, would accentuate the trade-off dilemma. But there 
is a more basic cause for its persistence in dualistic economies, 
which relates to the fact that both physical and human capital 
accumulation are needed for broad-based economic growth. A higher 
rate of economic growth accelerate the economy's potential to 
accumulate physical capital, whereas an intensification of the anti-
dualistic effort - i.e., promoting national creativity and the 
productivity of the backward sectors - increases human capital 
accumulation at a faster rate. 
Initially, at least, a higher rate of economic growth can be 
obtained from plans that hew closer to modern-sector-based development 
line, since the national capacity to create technology, and of the 
rest of the economy to accumulate physical capital, are initially 
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small.6/ On the other hand, for a given economic growth rate, more 
human capital accumulation could be obtained from plans that hew 
closer to anti-dualistic development line. Essential ingredients 
for modern sector growth have been imported technology, equipment 
and intermediate materials. Equally essential for developing the 
"rest of the economy" would be physical capital inputs, much of 
which have to come initially from the modern sector. Closely linked 
to the trade-off between the economic growth rate and the intensity 
of efforts to reduce dualism are therefore, the choioes between 
importing and creating technology for the modern sector, and between 
proportioning physical capital to the two sectors. 
This suggests a few general guidelines on technological choice 
for the Latin American modern sector during the initial phases of 
the anti-dualistic style of development«. 
(a) In the modern sector, the effort to create technology should 
initially concentrate on final consumer goods and house building 
materials, notably on product simplification and increased use of 
local materials. As these are not direct inputs to other productive 
activities, the risks and costs of technological experimentation with 
products and processes would be isolated, rather than magnified by an 
adverse impact on the cost and quality of other products. Successful 
results, on the other hand, would create new demands for equipment 
and materials supplied mainly by the modern sector, with some stimulus 
also to raw materials production in the "rest of the economy". 
The evaluation methods of conventional national income 
accounting exaggerate the true social gain, by overestimating 
national economic growth in dualistic economies with considerable 
production for subsistance and highly projected modern sectors. 
The value of the subsistance goods and services given up when 
their production becomes commercialized is underestimated, 
while monopoly pricing leads to some overestimating of the value 
of output of the modern sector. It is very doubtful, however, 




An especially valuable feedback from such efforts would be the 
build up of machine designing capability, an essential characteristic 
of technologically creative economies« To quote from a Swedish 
engineer-economist: 
"The engineering industry is less limited by natural resources 
than most other industries, and human effort, skill and 
organizational ability are consequently key factors. And it 
appears that the development efforts within the engineering 
sector have at least as powerful an influence on overall 
development and consequently on the per capita incomes as the 
latter have in stimulating the growth of the sector. So the 
"proper" level of technological sophistication for a particular 
locality, or the right degree of capital intensity as opposed, to 
labour intensity, may lose much then of ics relevance. The 
reason for this is that in a sector with rapid organic growth 
of skills and 'technology it is not the starting level of 
technical sophistication or of capital/labour intensity, that 
counts but the way these factors change over time."7/ 
(b) On the other hand, intermediate materials widely used by 
the modern sector, should for that very reason continue to rely on 
best-practice imported technology in the initial phases. The 
expanding economies of scale and technological subteties of 
continuous process technologies, such as in steel, basic chemicals 
and petrochemicals, and steam electric power production, are 
difficult enough for Latin America to keep up with. While adapting 
processes to differences in the composition of indigenous coal, 
mineral ores, and chemical feedstocks have often accompanied the 
establishment of plants in these activities, the redesigning has 
typically been done by foreign design teams. Progressively enlarging 
the participation of Latin American professionals in design adaptation 
would probably be the least risky way of developing cadres of local 
design talent. In this way a local talent base could be built up in 
time to design processes that extend the range of local raw materials 
7/ Jon Sigurdson, "Technology and Employment in China" World 
~~ Development. Vol. 2, NQ 3 (March 1974) pp. 75-85. For similar^ 
observations concerning machine building capability and economic 
growth in 19th century industrializes, see Natham Rosenberg, 
"Technological change in the machine tool industry, 1840-1910", 
Journal of Economic History, December, 1963» PP« 414-443. 
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the country is able to exploit economically, while minimizing the 
effect of the build up on the costs and export competitiveness of 
the modern sector. 
(c) The neglect of the independent inventor, illustrated 
previously indicates another fruitful opening for building up 
creativity in the modern sector. Indeed, the ignis fatuus of the 
typical independent inventor, a financial killing, could even be 
used to turn his creative efforts toward improving "rest of the 
economy" techniques. In R & D financing, research costs are typically 
a small fraction of the cost of developing innovation to marketable 
levels of reliability, quality and production costs. Thus the costs 
of D are a much greater deterrent to independent creative efforts 
than the costs of R. 
This suggests ti<ro additional functions for national science-
technology councils. One is to select from the creations submitted 
by independent inventors, those that hold promise of being socially 
valuable within the overall criteria of the anti-dualistic development 
strategy, and to provide equipment and testing centres for carrying 
out intermediate stages of product and process development: in 
especially promising cases financing through the pilot plant stage 
might bo warranted. The second function would be to act as a conduit 
to government and private finance for bringing to production the 
creations that pass the intermediate development stages successfully. 
The availability of such developed creations could also become one 
of the criterion governing decisions on whether to allow a firm to 
import a similar technology under license. 
(d) Creating channels for supplying design and trouble shooting 
assistance from the modern to the "rest of the economy" sector should 
be another important objective. This is one of the major components 
of the Chinese "walking on two legs" development strategy that has 
impressed many observers.8/ In this strategy the modern urban sector 
8/ E.g., E.L. Wheelwright and Bruce McFarlane, The Chinese Road to 
Socialism (1970); Sartaj Aziz, "The Chinese approach to rural 
development" World Development, Vol. 2 NQ 2 (February, 197^), and 
Jon Sigurdson, "Technology and employment in China", op. cit. 
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supplies little financial assistance to the rural sector; the flow 
via taxes seems rather to be the other way. What is supplied is a 
wide range of technological assistance to the rural communes, 
including designs for very scaled-down and simplified cement, metal 
refining, ball-bearing, and chemical fertilizer plants, built mainly 
with local labour and building materials, and processing local raw 
materials. Such plants have spread rapidly through the commune 
system, and play a key role in the successful Chinese recreation of 
Period I agroindustry dynamics. 
The Chinese commune system as such is not directly transferable 
to Latin American conditions. Cultural and ideological barriers 
apart, there are two basic economic reasons why Latin American 
countries could not effectively copy the commune arrangement without 
major alterations. One is that while China's rural area is much more 
densely populated than is Latin America's, its road system is much 
less developed. The Chinese communes are therefore densely populated 
units usually separated from urban centres by high transport costs. 
Under these circumstances a network of small commune plants can 
deliver intermediate materials for local use almost as cheaply as 
a small number of efficient large scale plants more distantly 
located.^/ With some possible exceptions in the Andean Altiplane 
and Mexico, large densely populated rural districts isolated by 
high transport costs, and convertible into equally self-contained 
but dynamic subeconomies, do not exist in Latin America. The second 
is that Latin American modern sectors tend to be relatively larger 
and the subsistanee sectors are usually more lacking in indigenous 
skills and co-operative traditions, than is the case in China. 
Finance in Latin America would, therefore, have to flow from the 
modern to the subsistanee sector, rather than the reverse. Similarly, 
technical and organizational supervision from the modern scctor would 
probably have to be applied more closely, paternalistically, and 
2/ Jon Sigurdson, "Technology and employment in China", op. cjt. 
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perhaps for a longer period, than was the case in China, before 
the "primitive" sector is able to develop a strong technological 
and accumulative momentum of its own. 
Now to work out effective linkages between the modern sector 
and the "rest of the economy", notably with the subsistance sector, 
is one of the major tasks that would face an anti-dualistic 
development strategy in Latin America. The Chinese example, merely 
indicates that it can be done under much more difficult initial 
circumstances than those that would confront efforts at innovative 
Latin American solutions; it is not, however, directly importable. 
Concluding remarks 
It should be apparent that the foregoing analysis is in no 
way a case for technological autarchy, but rather for accelerating 
Latin America's entry into Phase II as a necessary condition for 
more equitable socio-economic development. The region under the 
most realistically optimistic projection about the growth of its 
indigenous creativity, will continue for some time to be mainly 
dependent on foreign sources for new technology. Nor does achieving 
in time a broad capability for technological creativity mean 
anything other than that Latin America would then be able to 
participate more effectively in the exchange of technology which has 
so powerfully facilitated the economic progress of centre countries. 
Thus the case for assigning highest priority to developing 
technological creativity does not imply curtailing parallel efforts 
to improve the region's "technological terms of trade". Indeed, the 
bargaining superiority of foreign technology suppliers is not due 
to a malevolent conspiracy but rests on the fact that they are 
profit seekers with much more powerful options supporting their 
bargaining positions than are available to Latin American buyers of 
technology. Developing indigenous technological options for the 
buyers can therefore only strengthen the effectiveness of efforts 
to improve the "technological terms of trade". 
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The document has only been able to sketch in general terms the 
system maintaining forces that have guided Latin America along its 
highly destorted and socially inequitable modernization path. Some 
suggestions for technological policy have also been drawn in general 
terms. Obviously, for specific applications each country will need 
to analyse in much greater detail its existing obstacles and the 
potentialities for applying institutional and technological 
innovations, for which analysis, however, the document we trust 
provides a useful general framework. Since the countries of the 
region differ in their levels of skills, natural resources and 
ideologies, implementation of these broad policy suggestions will 
vary in pace and content. However, the present endowment of skills 
and technical talent of even the small Latin American countries 
should suffice to enable them to begin work along at least some of 
the general policy lines of thè strategy suggested here. 

